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I. INTRODUCTION
No subject is more suited for a symposium entitled, The Collision of Two
Ideals: Legal Ethics and the World of Alternative Dispute Resolution, than
the alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") newcomer collaborative law. With
its meteoric ascension, in just fifteen years collaborative law has gone from
an idea in the mind of a family law practitioner, burned out by the bitterness
of his practice, to a virtual ADR movement with thousands of practitioners
stretching across North America. 1 Like many of its ADR predecessors,
collaborative law involves a nonadversarial participatory process of informal
conferences by the parties and their lawyers to achieve settlement. 2 Given
that this type of interest-based bargaining and creative problem solving is not
new, 3 what is the collaborative law buzz all about?
Collaborative law's unique twist is that everyone agrees in advance that
the lawyers participate solely for settlement purposes and cannot represent
either party in litigation.4 By placing the clients in this "container" where
they are free from the threat of litigation, collaborative lawyers claim they
can resolve disputes cheaper, faster, and fairer than the litigation
alternative-at least for family law disputes.5 While touted as the tool of the
future for all civil disputes, collaborative law remains largely relegated to the
family law world.6
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
1 See John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315,
1325-28 (2003) (chronicling the remarkable speed at which collaborative law has spread).
2 See id. at 1317-19 (describing collaborative law).
3 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (developing interest-based, problem solving
negotiation strategies).
4 Typically, this is achieved through the use of a written participation agreement that
includes a disqualification provision. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
5 See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 60-61, 233-34 (2001) (describing the
"container" concept and claiming collaborative law is more efficient and economical than
mediation or litigation).
6 See William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging
Practice, 4 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 354 (2004) (noting the vast majority of
collaborative law cases are still divorce cases despite interest in expansion).
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Collaborative law's glass ceiling is legal ethics. Unlike other forms of
alternative dispute resolution, collaborative law's growth is hampered by
questions of compatibility with rules of professional ethics. 7 Critics,
including some collaborative law practitioners, find it difficult to square the
principles and practices of collaborative law with the professional rules of
ethics concerning everything from zealous advocacy to confidentiality to
terminating representation. 8 Hence, the ideals of legal ethics collide with the
ideals of collaborative law. "A Titan against a Titan!" 9
Before the clash of these legal titans occurs, this Article proposes a
solution-a new Model Rule. Rather than continue the current academic
exercise of trying to fit collaborative law within a legal ethical framework
that was not designed for it, a better approach is to squarely address the
compatibility issues with a new rule of professional ethics. As a threshold
matter, Part II explores the value of professional ethical rules, especially in
the context of collaborative law. Part III then surveys collaborative law
practice and evaluates collaborative law success claims. In Part IV, the
central ethical concerns about collaborative law practice are examined, as
well as current attempts by the collaborative law profession and state
legislatures to provide more control over the practice. Concluding that there
remains a need for ethical guidance, Part V presents the text and comment
for Proposed Model Rule 2.2-The Collaborative Lawyer.
II. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF NEW RULES
Recently, a number of commentators have questioned the need for new
ethical rules. Charles Pou, a seasoned ADR veteran, explains: "All too often
when ethical questions arise within the ADR community, the response is
'let's write a rule.' While well intentioned, this answer leaves us with more
than enough rules and standards of conduct."' 10 This opposition to new
ethical rules is grounded on the belief that alternative methods exist to train
7 See Lande, supra note 1, at 1329 ("[T]he disqualification agreement is a major
barrier to acceptance by major businesses and law firms.").
8 See infra Part [V.A. 1-4 (developing areas of ethical concern).
9 CLASH OF THE TrrANs (MGM 1981). The advice from one of three blind old
witches to Perseus to save his fiancd Andromeda from being sacrificed to the titan
Kraken was to turn the Kraken into stone with the head of Medusa, also a titan. Hence the
classic line: "A Titan against a Titan!" Ironically, the Kraken was not a titan at all, but a
Scandinavian sea monster.
10 Charles Pou, Jr., Enough Rules Already, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 19.
Pou colorfully adds: "While added rules may on rare occasion be needed, any major
focus on 'top down' rule rewriting risks being non-inclusive, as well as inactive navel-
gazing." Id. at 20.
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ADR professionals on ethical issues.11 While ethics hotlines and case studies
may be effective techniques to explore ADR ethics, there is still immense
value in well-drafted rules of ethics.
Law remains a largely self-regulating profession. 12 While each
jurisdiction embraces a code of ethics, for the most part these rules are not
enforced. Out of necessity, state regulators focus on only a subset of ethical
issues to protect the public. It is not surprising that disciplinary actions occur
in only a small fraction of complaints. 13 This does not, however, render
ethical rules moribund.
Rules of ethics serve a vital educational function. Those who are new to
the practice of law need guidance on their role and responsibilities. 14
Similarly, lawyers who are new to a particular practice area benefit from
clear rule-based guidance. This is particularly true in the field of alternative
dispute resolution. While lawyers embrace new representational models,
scant attention is given to developing a coherent ethical foundation for these
new representational roles. As Professor Kimberlee Kovach succinctly puts
it: "New approaches to representation need fresh and different ethical
guidelines and rules."'15 Even in the absence of specific enforcement efforts,
new rules serve a vital educational purpose in certain contexts. 16
I1 See Charles Pou, Jr., "Embracing Limbo": Thinking About Rethinking Dispute
Resolution Ethics, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 199, 211-13 (2003) (describing use of hotlines,
ethics websites, and case studies to improve ethics training); Joseph R. Herkert, Biting the
Apple (But Not Inhaling): Lessons from Engineering Ethics for Alternative Dispute
Resolution Ethics, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 119, 132-35 (2003) (describing use of the case
study method).
12 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS
§ 1.02 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining lawyer self-governance).
13 According to the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, in 2003 a national
total of 119,863 complaints were received by attorney disciplinary agencies. This resulted
in a national total of 2,912 formal disciplinary actions being filed. The median per
jurisdiction was 1,507 complaints yielding 40 formal actions filed. There were 1,280,737
lawyers in 2003. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Survey on Lawyer
Discipline Systems, Chart 1: Lawyer Population and Agency Caseload (2003),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/03-ch 1 .xls.
14 It has been my personal experience as a teacher of professional ethics that future
lawyers do not intuit the answer to legal ethical questions and that rules provide a vital
roadmap to law students as they struggle with these issues.
15 Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with Practice: Plurality in
Lawyering Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards, 39 IDAHO L. REV.
399, 416 (2003).
16 Id. at 417 (identifying codes of ethics as the primary tool to educate lawyers about
their professional responsibilities).
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Is collaborative law one of these contexts? Dean Nancy Rapoport has
developed a helpful test for determining if new and distinct ethical rules are
warranted in a specific area of legal practice. 17 First, the test for new separate
rules includes a baseline assessment of whether there is a poor fit with the
practice area and the generalist models of ethics rules. 18 This assessment is
followed by "second order" questions. These include: (1) the degree to which
repeat players interact with novices, (2) the existence of different
jurisdictional layers, (3) ease of enactment of a uniform code, and (4)
benefits of a single code for the practice area balanced by disadvantages of
abandoning uniform state regulation. 19  Applying the Rapoport test to
mediation, Professor Kovach concludes that new and distinct rules are
necessary because of the influx of new, inexperienced lawyers into the
field.20
Like mediation, collaborative law is another good candidate for its own,
new ethical rules. With predictions of collaborative law jettisoning to the
forefront of dispute resolution techniques, 21 many lawyers new to the
concept are confronting it. They will need education on the underlying
ethical principles of the collaborative process. Indeed, the fundamental
paradigm shift from adversarial to collaborative makes this field one of the
most appropriate for new ethical guidelines.22 Purely from an educational
perspective, new rules for collaborative law seem warranted.
Applying the Rapoport test to collaborative law leads to the same
conclusion. There is an obvious problem of "fit" between the current codes
of ethics and collaborative law. 23 Practitioners and academics point to the
disconnect between the fundamental premise of adversarial representation
17 See Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of
Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKRa. INST. L. REv. 45 (1998). Rapoport concludes that new
ethics rules are necessary for bankruptcy practice. Id. at 101.
18 Id. at 65.
19 Id. at 70-77.
20 See Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming
Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem
Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 957-58 (2001).
21 Collaborative law is predicted to "become mainstream in a significantly shorter
period of time than it has taken for mediation." Chip Rose, Collaborative Concepts, Mar.
2002, http://www.mediate.com/articles/editrose2.cfm.
22 See Kovach, supra note 15, at 416 (identifying the transition from competition to
collaboration as an area for new ethical rules); Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of
Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from the Collaborative Lawyering Research
Project, 2004 J. DisP. RESOL. 179, 209 (2004) (noting inexperienced collaborative
lawyers cannot fully anticipate future ethical issues).
23 See infra Part IV.A. 1-2.
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embodied in the model codes and rules and the cooperative approach of
collaborative law. 24 Just as Dean Rapoport concluded in the bankruptcy
context, the adversarial model "completely misses the boat. 25
Rapoport's second order questions also support a move to separate new
rules for collaborative law. Lawyers new to the practice of collaborative law
routinely mix with those more seasoned in the process. While there may not
be compelling jurisdictional complexity, there is a growing multiplicity of ad
hoc ethical rules being promulgated by collaborative law groups.26 These
differing sets of guidelines increase the need for a uniform ethical code. As
proposed in this article, special ethical rules for collaborative lawyers could
be adopted on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis based on a model rule.
Thus, state experimentation can be accommodated while preserving the
benefits that come from specific guidance for the collaborative lawyer.
One final point informs the need for new rules for collaborative law.
Collaborative lawyers themselves give little attention to ethical issues. One
recent study dramatically concludes that "[o]utside a small group of
experienced practitioners, the study has found little explicit acknowledgment
and recognition of ethical issues among CL lawyers." 27 As a result, "CL
lawyers manage the day-to-day and meeting-by-meeting dynamics of their
cases within a context of almost unconstrained professional discretion."28
Such a practice environment literally screams out for new ethical rules.
29
24 See, e.g., James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in
Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431, 442 (2002); Kovach, supra note
15, at 415. But see Lande, supra note 1, at 1343 (concluding that "CL is a distinctive form of
representation that theoretically can fit within established concepts of legal practice."). For a
more complete discussion of these tensions, see infra Part IV.A.
25 Rapoport, supra note 17, at 66.
26 See infra Part IV.B.
27 Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 208.
28 Id. at 211.
29 Given the general absence of awareness of ethical issues among collaborative law
practitioners themselves, self-governance is unlikely to be an effective alternative. Thus,
assertions that collaborative law's "collegial and personal nature... effectively
minimizes unethical conduct" are questionable. See Joshua Isaacs, Current Development,
A New Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical Implications Surrounding
Collaborative Law, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 833, 841 (2005) (making the self-
governance claim).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
III. COLLABORATIVE LAW
A. Crucible and Characteristics
The origins of collaborative law are well chronicled. The hyper-
adversarial world of family law served as the crucible. In 1990, Stuart Webb,
a Minnesota family law practitioner, was searching for a better way to
resolve divorce disputes-better for both the family members and for his
own mental health and well-being.30 Rejecting the adversarial nature
common to his practice area, Webb began experimenting with other trusted
lawyers to settle family law cases through a process of nonadversarial
collaboration with the parties. He resolved to stop going to court and only
represent clients who chose to actively participate in negotiations to achieve
settlement. In the rare cases where the negotiation process broke down,
Webb withdrew and the client was compelled to find new litigation
counsel. 31
Webb's experiment turned into a grass roots movement. He formed the
Collaborative Law Institute, a nonprofit organization to help spread the
collaborative law doctrine. 32 By the early 1990s, collaborative law reached
the West Coast and the hands of another pioneer in the field, Pauline
Tesler.33 In the next decade, collaborative law groups proliferated following
a predictable path. Typically, they sprang up around one or two key
individuals who received exposure to the collaborative law practice
elsewhere. These key figures returned home--energized and motivated to
proselytize the collaborative law approach.34 Indeed, the intensity of the
support for collaborative law is amazing. Some proponents of the new
30 Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris F. Tennant, Collaborative Law-An Emerging
Practice, BOSTON B.J., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 12, 27; Stuart Webb, An Idea Whose Time Has
Come: Collaborative Law: An Alternative for Attorneys Suffering from "Family Law
Burnout," MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, July 2000, at 7.
31 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 354-55 (describing Webb's development of
collaborative law).
32 See Collaborative Law Institute of Minnesota, http://www.collaborativelaw.org
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
33 Schwab, supra note 6, at 355. Pauline Tesler is recognized as one of the pioneers
of collaborative law. Along with Stuart Webb, Tesler was the recipient of the ABA
Dispute Resolution Section's first "Lawyer as Problem Solver" Award in 2002. Lande,
supra note 1, at 1327. Tesler has literally written the book on collaborative law. See
TESLER, supra note 5.
34 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 190.
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practice speak of it with almost cult-like fanaticism noting their "conversion"
or collaborative law as "saving one's soul." 35
Regardless of the level of fervor with which it is embraced, collaborative
law is a distinct dispute resolution device defined by certain characteristics.
The cornerstone of the collaborative law approach is the commitment by both
counsel and clients to resolve the dispute through a cooperative participatory
process leading to settlement and to avoid litigation. 36 This is often referred
to as a paradigm shift away from a traditional adversarial model to a
problem-solving model. 37 Thus, the win-lose dynamic typical of litigation is
replaced with essentially a team approach.38
The team approach is best illustrated by a collaborative technique known
as the "four-way conference." This is where the real work of the
collaborative law process is done. Both parties and their counsel participate
in group meetings to resolve the dispute and ensure the transparency of the
process. 39 To facilitate the four-way conferences, parties and counsel commit
themselves to good faith negotiation.40 Similarly, full, open, and honest
disclosure of all relevant information by the parties without request is
expected. 41 In this manner, costly and contentious discovery disputes are
avoided. These structural process changes are designed to encourage
attorneys to work cooperatively and creatively while empowering clients to
play an active role in resolving their own disputes. 42 While not the norm,
some collaborative counsel take the four-way concept to the extreme: they
35 See id. at 192; Lande, supra note 1, at 1317-18 n.3 (noting parallels to religious
conversion, a calling, and ministry); Kevin Mayhood, Different Style of Divorce Lets
Couples Work Things Out, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 13, 2005, at 7C (describing
cult like fanaticism of some collaborative lawyers).
36 Lande, supra note 1, at 1317-19.
37 TESLER, supra note 5, at 78; Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 30, at 12.
38 See Kovach, supra note 20, at 975 (describing the team approach of problem
solving with collaborative law); Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation
Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 479, 480-81 (2000) (describing winner and loser characteristics of
adversarial litigation).
39 Lande, supra note 1, at 1320-21.
40 TESLER, supra note 5, at 143-45.
41 Lande, supra note 1, at 1321.
42 Lawrence, supra note 24, at 433-34 (explaining how collaborative law
encourages attorney and client cooperation and legitimization of interests); Chip Rose,
Introduction to Collaborative Negotiating, http://www.mediate.com/articles/rose3.cfm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (describing collaborative law's attention to the process and
outcome needs of clients).
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will only meet with their clients to discuss substantive issues in the context of
a four-way conference. 43
To ensure that clients and counsel fully understand and accept the
obligations of collaborative law, a participation agreement is used. This is a
written contractual commitment between counsel and parties outlining the
collaborative law requirements. Participation agreements typically include
provisions on working cooperatively, avoiding litigation, engaging in good
faith questions and answers, and participation in four-way conferences. 44
Consistent with the cooperative approach, provisions relating to the use of
joint experts are also prevalent.45
One provision of the participation agreement merits particular
attention-the disqualification provision. Also known as a withdrawal or
termination requirement, the disqualification provision provides the real
force behind collaborative law. If the collaborative process disintegrates and
either party decides to litigate, representation by all collaborative counsel
terminates requiring all parties to get new litigation counsel.46 This
agreement in advance to withdraw from representation has been a lightening
rod for ethical controversy. 47 While withdrawing collaborative lawyers still
facilitate the transfer of representation to new counsel, clients must bear the
increased costs-both financial and emotional-of bringing in new
lawyers. 48 Nonetheless, collaborative lawyers contend the disqualification
provision is essential to the effectiveness of collaborative law because it tests
at the outset of representation the true level of commitment to the process.
For example, Pauline Tesler adamantly states, "There is really only one
irreducible minimum condition for calling what you do 'collaborative law':
43 See Lande, supra note 1, at 1320-21 & n. 11 (describing "extreme approach" of
declining to have substantive client discussions outside of the four-way conferences).
44 See TESLER, supra note 5, at 143-45 (noting components of agreement);
Lawrence, supra note 24, at 433-36 (outlining components); Tom Arnold, Collaborative
Dispute Resolution-An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, in ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials: ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOuR ADVANTAGE!
379, 383-89 (Oct. 2000) (describing elements of participation agreement).
45 TESLER, supra note 5, at 56 n. 1. Collaborative law clients also may waive the
right to retain separate experts. Id. at 138.
4 6 Id. at6.
47 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 1, at 1328-29 (explaining article's focus on the
disqualification agreement).
48 See John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 283-84 (2004) (describing costs of bringing in new
lawyers); Isaacs, supra note 29, at 836 (describing emotional cost); Susan B. Apel,
Collaborative Law: A Skeptic's View, VT. B.J., Spring 2004, at 41, 41 (describing
profound hardship on client, including costs and psychological strain).
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you and the counsel for the other party must sign papers disqualifying you
from ever appearing in court on behalf of either of these clients against the
other."49'
B. Evaluating Collaborative Law
Collaborative law proponents tout the success of this new form of ADR.
They claim that collaborative law is cheaper, settles more cases, and does so
in a way that leaves everyone feeling better about the process. 50 Hence,
lawyers across the country are recognizing the advantages of this new dispute
resolution technique and embracing it with aplomb. Until recently, indicia of
success for collaborative law were gleaned from the anecdotes of
collaborative lawyers themselves. 51 We now benefit fiom the research results
of two systematic studies on collaborative law to test the common claims
made about it. Is collaborative law really the effective, cheap, and quick
dispute resolution device as proponents claim?
Professor Julie Macfarlane recently published the preliminary results of a
multi-year examination based upon case studies where collaborative law was
used.52 Her initial inquiry was to determine whether the collaborative model
was any different from traditional negotiation. 53 After gathering data from
over 150 separate interviews from 2001-04, Macfarlane concludes that
collaborative law is a separate and distinct ADR process--one that "fosters a
spirit of openness, cooperation, and commitment to finding a solution that is
49 TESLER, supra note 5, at 6. Recently, some collaborative law practitioners have
spun-off "cooperative" law (collaborative law minus the disqualification provision) as an
alternative. Proponents of this variant believe it is just as effective as its collaborative
sibling, less risky to the client, and is more likely to be accepted outside of the family law
context. See Lande & Herman, supra note 48, at 284 (describing cooperative law); see
also infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and
Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional
Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REv. 475, 488 (2005) ("Collaborative law practice is touted as
more cost-effective, more creative, and less damaging to the clients' relationship than
traditional adversarial litigation."); William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement
Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 367, 401 (1999) (detailing the collaborative law
process and noting that it "has been found to reduce both contentiousness and cost").
51 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 367 (describing the lack of research to assess
collaborative law).
52 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 187-89 (describing methodology).
53 Id. at 189.
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qualitatively different, at least in many cases, from conventional lawyer-to-
lawyer negotiations." 54
Macfarlane's conclusion on the qualitative effectiveness of collaborative
law is complemented by the survey results recently completed by practitioner
William Schwab. In March 2003, Schwab surveyed 361 collaborative
lawyers.55 The results of this survey confirm many of the settlement rate
claims made by collaborative lawyers. Schwab found an overall settlement
rate of 87.4% with recent cases settling at a rate of 92.1%.56 The survey
results also point toward some significant regional differences. Texas had the
highest settlement success rate at 94.1%. Ohio fell in the middle with an
88.3% rate. The lowest settlement rate was California at 78.7%. 57 These
settlement rates, while lower than some collaborative lawyers' claims,
"compare[] favorably with previously reported divorce mediation settlement
rates." 5 8
Schwab also gathered data on the claim by collaborative lawyers that the
process is faster. Proponents claim that a collaborative case lasts from one to
seven months. 59 Schwab's survey results yielded a range from one and one-
half to sixteen months. 60 The average length of a collaborative case,
however, was 6.3 months-within the high range of collaborative lawyers'
claims. 61
According to proponents, significant cost savings can also be achieved
with collaborative law. For example, Pauline Tesler claims that collaborative
law cases are 1/10 to 1/5 the cost of similar cases if litigated.62 Schwab tends
54 Id. at 200.
55 Seventy-one responded yielding a response rate of 19.8%. Schwab, supra note 6,
at 367-70 (describing methodology).
56 Id. at 375.
57 Id.
58 Id. Claims of settlement rates well above 90% exist. See Robert W. Lueck, The
Collaborative Law (R)evolution: An Idea Whose Time has Come in Nevada, NEV.
LAWYER, Apr. 2004, at 18, 20.
59 Schwab, supra note 6, at 376.
60 Id. at 377.
61 Id.
62 Diane Curtis, Collaborative Law-Solving Disputes the Friendly Way, CAL. ST.
B.J., Jan. 2005, at 1, 7 (quoting Tesler on cost comparison), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov. Other estimates of cost savings by collaborative lawyers are
not as high. See Jane Gross, Amicable Unhitching, With a Prod, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2004, at Fl (recounting a New York City collaborative lawyer's estimate of $15,000
compared to $30,000 with traditional litigation yielding a one-half cost savings),
available at http://www.nytimes.com (search "Site Search" for "Amicable Unhitching,
With a Prod"; then follow "Amicable Unhitching, With a Prod" hyperlink under "Search
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to confirm these cost savings, finding collaborative cases being resolved at
1/10 to 1/20 of conventional costs.63 However, Professor Macfarlane
questions whether such cost savings claims make the correct comparisons.
Rather than compare collaborative law to traditional litigation costs,
Macfarlane contends that the better comparison is not to litigation, but
collaborative law to negotiation. Consequently, claims that collaborative law
is cheaper or quicker are "still unproven" according to Macfarlane.
64
One indication of collaborative law's success is unquestioned: it is
rapidly spreading. There are currently more than 4,500 lawyers trained in
collaborative law. 65 Eighty-seven distinct collaborative law practice groups
exist.66 Collaborative law is practiced in at least 35 states.67 It flourishes in
certain jurisdictions including Minnesota, Ohio, Connecticut, Texas,
Georgia, and the Canadian provinces.68 Even cursory internet searches
return a bevy of collaborative law websites.69
Despite this rapid growth, collaborative law remains a practice almost
entirely limited to family law.70 Whether collaborative law will take hold
outside of the family law area remains to be seen. The expansion of
collaborative law outside of the family law context faces significant
challenges. One possible limitation to the overall expansion and use of
collaborative law is the current controversy concerning its compatibility with
legal ethics.71
Results").
63 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 355-56 (noting 1/10 to 1/20 of conventional costs).
64 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 211 (explaining that "[w]hether CL proves to be
cheaper and faster in such cases is still unproven" because the better cost comparison is
to lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation, not litigation).
65 Gross, supra note 62, at F11.
66 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 186, 190.
67 Gross, supra note 62, at Fl 1.
68 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 186.
69 See Lueck, supra note 58, at 20 (noting at least 68 websites).
70 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 354; Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 186.
71 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 1, at 1329 ("[T]he disqualification agreement is a
major barrier to acceptance by major businesses and law firms."). Professor Peppet
disagrees. He identifies a lack of reputational information, fee structure, and fear of client
loss as the true impediments to expansion of collaborative law outside of the family law
context. See Peppet, supra note 50, at 490-92.
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IV. COLLABORATIVE LAW AND LEGAL ETHICS
A. Issues of Compatibility
Despite collaborative law's fervent advocates, questions about its
compatibility with current codes of legal ethics continue to dominate the
conversation about this new form of ADR.72 Four specific ethical issues
garner attention. First, concerns exist about whether collaborative law is
consistent with the duty of loyalty-often labeled as "zealous advocacy."
Second, as with mediation, concerns about the duty of candor and
truthfulness to others are present with collaborative law. Third, questions
about the compatibility of the disqualification provision with the rules
governing termination of representation continue. Finally, fears over
potential breaches of the duty of confidentiality also remain. Collaborative
law faces challenges with each of these ethical hurdles for a common reason.
General rules of ethics governing traditional practice were drafted without
collaborative law in mind and are ill-suited to the new collaborative process.
1. Zealous Advocacy or Zealotry
Zealous advocacy is the centerpiece of much of the concern about the
ability of collaborative law to fit neatly with current ethical codes. The
debate, however, operates at several distinct levels. Initially, there is
disagreement among collaborative lawyers as to their proper role in relation
to the nonclient and opposing counsel. In essence, does the collaborative
lawyer owe any duty to others in the collaborative process? If so, can this
duty be fulfilled consistent with current ethical rules? A necessary subset of
this analysis is whether a duty of zealous advocacy exists at all, and if so,
what the parameters are. This provides a logical starting point.
A duty of zealous advocacy is embodied in the canons of the ABA's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 7 is succinct: "A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."73
Canon 7, which looms commandment-like over the ethical landscape,
72 For the colloquy that framed the current debate see Lawrence, supra note 24; Sandra
S. Beckwith & Sherri Goren Slovin, The Collaborative Lawyer as Advocate: A Response,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 497 (2003); Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and
Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 505 (2003). Other commentators on collaborative law keep the focus clearly on
ethical considerations. See generally Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical
Reflection on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into
the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 141, 158-72 (2004); Lande, supra note 1.
73 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969).
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undoubtedly sprang from the ABA's turn-of-the-century Canons of
Professional Ethics. Canon 15 described the lawyer's duty as one of "entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. 74
Thus, the Model Code's duty of zealous advocacy is best understood as a
duty of diligence-an obligation to vigorously pursue a client's legitimate
objectives. 75
At some point, zealous representation took a turn for the worse. Some
attorneys began to confuse (or rationalize) zealousness with an obligation to
be aggressive with opposing clients and counsel. Consequently, some viewed
zealous advocacy as a command to take every action not prohibited by law,
no matter how repugnant. Attorneys choosing this path earned unflattering
labels such as "Rambo" or "pitbull litigator." 76
In 1981, the ABA adopted its first incarnation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. With this shift, zealous advocacy went from looming
to Lilliputian. What once existed at the canon-level, zeal was demoted to the
commentary on the duty of diligence contained in Model Rule 1.3: "A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."'77 Even this reference to
zeal was placed in proper perspective by the subsequent comment that a
lawyer is not bound "to press for every advantage that might be realized for a
client."' 78 The rulemakers further tried to deflate the "hired gun" image in
2002 with an addition to the commentary making explicit that a lawyer's
duty does not include use of offensive tactics. 79 Nonetheless, the idea that
74 American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 15, reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 2004-2005 ABRIDGED
EDITION 581, 585 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2004). Professor Dzienkowski notes that the
first thirty-two canons were adopted on August 27, 1908. Id. at 581.
75 See D. Todd Sholar, Note, Collaborative Law-A Method for the Madness, 23
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 667, 678 (1993) (equating zeal with a general obligation of
diligence).
76 See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade,
74 TEx. L. REv. 259, 304 (1995) (describing the hired gun and Rambo analogies);
Kovach, supra note 15, at 407 (noting Rambo approach); Macfarlane, supra note 22, at
201 (including pitbull and other references).
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1981). The Model Rules also
include a reference to zealous advocacy in the preamble stating that as an "advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." Id.
pmbl. 2.
78 Id.
79 Id. ("The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use
of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process
with courtesy and respect.").
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attorneys have an ethical obligation to take every action to benefit their
clients persists. 80
Can collaborative law, with its paradigm shift to problem solving,
coexist with an inherently adversarial duty of zealous advocacy-even one
narrowly conceived under the current Model Rules? Some think so.
Combining Model Rule 1.2 concerning the scope of representation 8' with
Rule 1.3's zealous advocacy, one commentator concludes that "the Rules at
least suggest that it is permissible for lawyers to fulfill their professional duty
of zealous representation while limiting the scope of the representation to the
terms of the [collaborative law] agreement. ' 82 There are certainly
collaborative law practitioners that concur.83 Add to this scenario the reality
that those lawyers gravitating toward collaborative law presumably reject
hardball litigation tactics in the first place. Consequently, in the main,
collaborative lawyers can go about their practice with little fear of violation
of this ethical duty.84
However, some collaborative lawyers conceive of their roles differently.
For example, James Lawrence believes the collaborative lawyer's
"responsibilities shift away from those associated with 'pure' advocacy and
toward the creative, flexible representation that characterizes neutrality. 85
Consequently, Lawrence contends that the collaborative lawyer falls in a
"unique ethical position" somewhere between the ethical posture of a
traditional advocate and a neutral. 86 Other collaborative lawyers think in
terms of an obligation to the entire family, not merely their own client.87 This
belief in a duty to nonclients, however, appears to be a minority view among
collaborative lawyers.88 Nonetheless, these divergent characterizations
80 See Kay Elkins-Elliott & Frank W. Elliott, Settlement Advocacy, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 7, 9 (2004) (describing the persistence of the "fearsome ogre of
zealous advocacy").
81 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2004) ("A lawyer may limit the
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the
client gives informed consent.").
82 Schwab, supra note 6, at 363-64.
83 See Susan M. Buckholz, Two Views on Collaborative Law, VT. B.J., Spring 2004,
at 37, 39 (describing compatibility with Rule 1.2).
84 See Lande & Herman, supra note 48, at 282 (suggesting the collaborative lawyers
have the best of both worlds with strong advocacy and negotiation).
85 Lawrence, supra note 24, at 442.
86 Id. at 439.
87 See Lande, supra note 1, at 1336 ("For example, some CL practitioners describe
lawyers' roles as serving the interests of the whole family as all or part of their
professional duty.").
88 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 380 (finding that the statement "Collaborative
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persist bolstering Professor Lande's conclusion that the basic collaborative
law model "can be consistent with norms of zealous advocacy though, in
practice, some variations... do not comply with those professional
norms." 89 The ultimate compatibility of collaborative law with the Model
Rules may hinge on which conceptualization is considered.90
2. Candor
Related to the ethical issue of zealous advocacy, the duty of candor is
also implicated by the use of collaborative law. 91 Concern about the
appropriate level of candor is the same issue currently debated in the context
of mediation and negotiation. 92 Traditionally, Model Rule 4.1, "Truthfulness
in Statements to Others," would control. Rule 4.1 requires that "[i]n the
course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person. '93 While the rule itself
seems straightforward, the comment that follows significantly alters the
burden for a lawyer in the context of negotiation:
[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular
statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the
circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain
types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.
Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in
this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except
where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.94
lawyers are more like neutrals than like counsel for individual clients" was widely
rejected). 84.1% of collaborative lawyers surveyed disagreed with the statement. Id. This
conclusion may be limited by Schwab's methodology of only surveying collaborative
lawyers engaging in family law practice.
89 Lande, supra note 1, at 1338.
90 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 366-67; see also Apel, supra note 48, at 42
(describing role confusion of collaborative lawyer which will invoke inherent conflicts).
91 Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 72, at 501-02.
92 See, e.g., Van M. Pounds, Promoting Truthfulness in Negotiation: A Mindful
Approach, 40 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 181 (2004); Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party
Empowerment-Against a Good-Faith Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REv.
LrrIG. 1 (2004); ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Good Faith
Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation
Programs (Aug. 7, 2004), http://www.abanet.org/dispute.html.
93 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (a) (2004).
94 Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
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Thus, in the context of negotiation, this comment supports an exception
for "puffery"-a euphemism for lying.95
Is there really a legitimate concern that lawyers would lie? Yes.9 6 Lying
has been characterized as "a permanent feature of advocacy" 97 and "central
to one's effectiveness in negotiations" 98 due to the common perception that
lying works. 99 Indeed, some believe that "zealous advocacy" means "a
lawyer is required to be disingenuous." 10 0 As a result, Model Rule 4.1 not
only fails to constrain this behavior, but actually legitimizes it-at least in the
context of negotiation.
Recent attempts to modify Rule 4.1 have been unsuccessful. A proposal
to include a duty of candor to mediators was rejected during the Ethics 2000
reforms of the Model Rules in 2002.101 While a duty of candor was extended
95 James Alfini, E2K Leaves Mediation in an Ethics "Black Hole," DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 2001, at 3 ("It thus opens the door for what some refer to as 'puffery,' and
others as lying, in negotiations."); John W. Cooley, Mediator & Advocate Ethics, DISP.
RESOL. J., Feb. 2000, at 73, 75 (noting comments suggest puffing is permissible and
noting the absence of a bright line distinguishing lying); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral
Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 51 (1994) ("The
codes are far less clear regarding the status of false statements made to opponents in
negotiation including whether such statements count as lies at all.").
96 As I have plainly stated before: "Lawyers lie." Fairman, supra note 72, at 525.
Others concur. See generally Pounds, supra note 92, at 186 (citing ABA study finding
61% of lawyers found it ethically permissible to engage in settlement puffery involving
misrepresentation and that 73% had engaged in puffery); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics
of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1219 (1990) (advancing a comprehensive
taxonomy for lawyer lying); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659
(1990) (concluding based upon her study that lawyer deception of clients is pervasive).
97 Wetlaufer, supra note 96, at 1272.
981Id.
99 See id. (contending "well-told lies are highly effective"); Pounds, supra note 92,
at 184-85 ("The lawyer is oftentimes confronted with circumstances where the use of
deception can and does work to permissibly strategic negotiation advantage."); cf. Andrea
Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 143 (2002) (arguing that the
effective hard-bargainer is a myth and reporting conclusions from her new empirical
study showing that effectiveness ratings drop for unethical adversarial bargainers).
100 See Wetlaufer, supra note 96, at 1255-57 (describing the argument that zealous
representation permits lying).
101 See Bruce E. Meyerson, Telling the Truth in Mediation: Mediator Owed Duty of
Candor, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 17 (advocating a duty of candor to
mediators); James J. Alfmi, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A
Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 255, 269-72 (1999) (proposing
revision to Rule 4.1).
[Vol. 21:1 20051
COLLABORATIVE LAW
to arbitration in revised Rule 3.3,102 mediation ended up with only a single
word--"ordinarily"-to qualify the puffery comment in Rule 4.1.103 Dean
James Alfini's characterization of this as an ethical "black hole" is
appropriate. 10 4 Yet this is precisely the place collaborative lawyers must turn
to for guidance. 105
Recently, the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association began
a formal attempt to recognize a distinction between the ethical duties of a
lawyer in the courtroom versus settlement negotiations. In August 2002, the
Litigation Section issued Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations. 106
These Ethical Guidelines include a duty of fair-dealing. 10 7 As to false
statements of material fact, the Ethical Guidelines include section 4.1.1 that
states: "In the course of negotiating or concluding a settlement, a lawyer
must not knowingly make a false statement of material fact (or law) to a third
102 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2002) (defining tribunal to
include an arbitrator); id. R. 3.3 cmt. 1 (noting duty is owed to a tribunal); see also
Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to
Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and State
Application, 54 ARK. L. REv. 207, 215-16 (2001) (describing a proposal to include other
ADR processes and noting ultimate rejection of the idea).
103 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2002).
104 Alfini, supra note 95, at 7. However, some argue that even illumination will not
help. See Peppet, supra note 50, at 510-11 (contending that revisions to Rule 4.1 calling
for a uniform aspirational ethics rule forbidding all deception would not stop it and is
unwise).
105 See Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 72, at 501-02.
106 See ABA Section of Litigation, Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ethics/settlementnegotiations.pdf.
107 Id. § 2.3 ("A lawyer's conduct in negotiating a settlement should be
characterized by honor and fair-dealing."). Similarly, an "attorney may not employ the
settlement process in bad faith." Id. § 4.3.1. Commentary to section 2.3 notes the novelty
of this approach:
While there is no Model Rule that expressly and specifically controls a lawyer's
general conduct in the context of settlement negotiations, lawyers should aspire to
be honorable and fair in their conduct and in their counseling of their clients with
respect to settlement. Model Rule 2.1 recognizes the propriety of considering moral
factors in, rendering legal advice and the preamble to the Model Rules exhorts
lawyers to be guided by "personal conscience and the approbation of professional
peers." Model Rules, Preamble, [7]. Cf. infra Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.3.1.
Whether or not a lawyer may be disciplined, sanctioned, or sued for failure to act
with honor and fairness based on specific legal or ethical rules, best practices dictate
honor and fair dealing. Settlement negotiations are likely to be more productive and
effective and the resulting settlement agreements more sustainable if the conduct of
counsel can be so characterized.
Id. § 2.3 cmt.
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person."'10 8 The comments, however, continue to embrace the Model Rules
definition of materiality. 10 9 The refusal to alter the materiality definition-
juxtaposed against a new good faith provision-sends a confusing message
to those looking for guidance on the duty of candor. 110 Consequently, the
effect of the Ethical Guidelines on lawyer ethics remains to be seen. I I
The responsibility of a lawyer to be truthful in a collaborative law
proceeding is a necessity.1 l2 Yet no ethical infrastructure supports this
baseline value. The Model Rules do not provide appropriate guidance for
collaborative law on the duty of candor. As to mediation, the rules are silent.
As to negotiation, the rules are counterproductive. 13 Alternative attempts,
like the ABA Litigation Section's Ethical Guidelines, do not add sufficient
108 Id. § 4.1.1.
109 The comment states:
The prohibition against making false statements of material fact or law is
intended to cover only representations of fact, and not statements of opinion or those
that merely reflect the speaker's state of mind. Whether a statement should be
considered one of fact, as opposed to opinion, depends on the circumstances. Model
Rule 4.1, comment 2. "Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain
types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates
of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to
an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category ... " Model Rule
4.1, comment 2.
Id. § 4.1.1 cmt.
110 See Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement
Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1218
(2004).
111 At least one additional limitation is that the Guidelines have not been approved
by the full ABA. Currently, the Guidelines carry the following disclaimer:
The Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations have not been approved by
the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association
and, accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the American
Bar Association. However, the American Bar Association recommends the Ethical
Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations as a resource designed to facilitate and
promote ethical conduct in settlement negotiations. These Guidelines are not
intended to replace existing law or rules of professional conduct or to constitute an
interpretation by the ABA of any of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and
should not serve as a basis for liability, sanctions or disciplinary action.
Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations, supra note 106, Preface.
112 There is anecdotal support of dishonesty in collaborative law. See Chip Rose,
The Creative Solution: Sibling Non-Rivalry, July 2003,
http://www.mediate.com/articles/rose4.cfn (adding comment after article dated 2/24/05
relating to dishonesty).
113 See Pounds, supra note 92, at 193 (pointing out how Rule 4.1 complicates a
determination of what is proscribed conduct).
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clarity to be exported to collaborative law. In the end, the "major ethical
issue relating to collaborative lawyering" 114 is ignored by current ethics
codes.
3. Termination
The ethical rules restricting an attorney's ability to terminate
representation are implicated by collaborative law's disqualification
agreement. The concern is a simple one. A client agrees to resolve a dispute
using collaborative law and signs the participation agreement. The four-way
conferences fail to lead to an agreeable settlement. The client is now forced
to choose between counsel of choice or collaborative law. Either choice
burdens the client. 115 To keep the current counsel, the client must continue
with the unproductive process. 116 Choosing new counsel costs the client
time, money, and energy at an especially bad time. 117 The rules of legal
ethics purposefully try to avoid this situation by limiting the ability of the
lawyer to terminate representation to certain defined situations. Does
collaborative law's disqualification provision fit within these circumstances?
Two provisions of Model Rule 1.16 are relevant. Under Rule 1.16(b)(4),
a lawyer may withdraw if "the client insists upon taking an action that the
lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement." 118 This provision, however, typically does not apply to
situations where a lawyer seeks to terminate representation based upon a
disagreement with the client about a settlement."19 Consequently, it is
unlikely to provide a sufficient anchor for the disqualification provision.
Model Rule 1.16(b)(5) is more fruitful. It provides that a lawyer may
withdraw if "the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that
the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled."'120 As applied to
114 Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 72, at 501.
115 See Spain, supra note 72, at 163-64 (noting substantial pressures caused by
invocation of disqualification agreement).
116 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 200 (describing client fears of having to stick
with collaborative law).
117 See Lande, supra note 1, at 1344.
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2004). This provision
changed in 2002. It formerly stated "imprudent" instead of the phrase "with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.16(b)(3) (2001).
119 See Lande, supra note 1, at 1345-46.
120 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 16(b)(5) (2004).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the disqualification agreement, the client's decision to discontinue with
collaborative law and pursue litigation breaches an obligation of the
participation agreement regarding a continuation of the lawyer's services.
The agreement itself serves as reasonable warning. A comment to Rule 1.16
seems to support withdrawal under these circumstances: "A lawyer may
withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating
to representation, such as an agreement... limiting the objectives of the
representation."' 12 1 Some commentators find this a sufficient basis for a
collaborative lawyer to withdraw consistent with the Model Rules. 122 To
date, however, no court or state ethics committee has examined the
disqualification provision under the termination rules. 123
Even if a court or committee tries to assess the compatibility of the
disqualification agreement with the Model Rules, it will be stymied by the
imprecise analogies of traditional practice. Recently, Professor John Lande
completed the most comprehensive examination of the ethical parameters of
the disqualification provision. 124  He identified retainer agreements
authorizing attorney withdrawal if the client failed to accept settlement
advice from the lawyer as the most analogous situation to traditional
practice. 125 Retainer agreements of this type are deemed illegal and void per
se in most U.S. jurisdictions because they place excessive settlement pressure
on the client.126 Thus, if collaborative law disqualification agreements are
121 Id. R. 1.16 cmt. 8.
122 See Spain, supra note 72, at 162-63 (stating Rule 1. 16(b)(5) "appears to provide
a basis for a collaborative lawyer to withdraw from further representation if an agreement
is not reached"). Professor Spain, however, has reservations regarding the permissibility
of advance consent to withdraw. Id. at 163. Spain also argues that the disqualification
agreement could be prohibited by a "strict interpretation of Rule 1.16" because "a client
would be better served by full service representation." Id. He relies, however, on Rule
1.16(b)(1), which is not a prerequisite to using 1.16(b)(5) for permissive withdrawal. Id.
Professor Lande also notes that this provision could be used to support the
disqualification provision. See Lande, supra note 1, at 1351 n.125 ("Although this
situation may not follow the exact language of the Model Rule comment, it seems
consistent with its intent and thus some courts or ethics committees might approve the
disqualification agreement on this basis.").
123 The North Carolina Bar Association recently issued a formal ethics opinion
approving the use of collaborative law under Model Rule 1.2 relating to the scope of
representation. It did not, however, address the termination rules. See N.C. St. Bar,
Formal Eth. Op. 1 (2002), available at 2002 WL 2029469 [hereinafter N.C. Formal Eth.
Op. 1]. Professor Peppet, however, has serious reservations that "mandatory mutual
withdrawal provisions can be squared with Rule 1.2." See Peppet, supra note 50, at 489.
124 See Lande, supra note 1, at 1344-79.
125 Id. at 1347.
126 See id at 1347-49 & n. 105 (detailing the wealth of authority rejecting the use of
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treated as withdrawal agreements, the disqualification agreements are
doomed as unethical. 127
Lande notes, however, that there are a number of significant differences
between the two provisions which make such ethical predictions difficult. 128
Under a traditional withdrawal agreement, the lawyer invokes the provision
for the lawyer's own benefit. In contrast, the disqualification provision under
collaborative law is designed with the client's interest in mind and to benefit
the client by creating incentives to keep bargaining. 129 This difference in
purpose undermines the "lawyer overreaching" rationale used to ban
withdrawal agreements. An even starker difference may cut the other way. A
collaborative law client can compel the disqualification of the other party's
counsel. 130 This situation-unaddressed by state ethics regulators--certainly
raises problems beyond those present in traditional withdrawal agreements.
With all the nuances of collaborative law and imperfect analogies to
traditional practice, Professor Lande ultimately concludes that
disqualification agreements should be viewed as compatible with the rules of
ethical conduct absent new evidence of serious harm to clients. 131
Lande also throws his support behind those collaborative law
practitioners who are reassessing the need for the disqualification agreement
in the first place. 132 Recently, some supporters of the philosophy behind
collaborative law have broken rank and offer "cooperative" law as an
alternative. 133 Cooperative law is essentially collaborative law minus the
disqualification provision. 134 Proponents of this variant contend that it has
the benefits of collaborative law without the draconian consequences if,
despite everyone's best efforts, settlement is not possible. 135 Further
withdrawal agreements).
127 While this is the foregone conclusion in U.S. jurisdictions, Lande points out that
Canadian courts might accept withdrawal agreements if they are fair and reasonable. See
id. at 1357-60.
128 See id at 1351-57 (developing five distinctions between withdrawal agreements
and disqualification provisions).
12 9 See id. at 1352-53.
130 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; Macfarlane, supra note 22, at
200 (describing collaborative law client forced to abandon counsel due to spouse's court
action); Apel, supra note 48, at 43 (stressing that clients must be advised that they are
placing control in the hands of someone whose interests may not be congruent).
131 Lande, supra note 1, at 1372-73.
132 See id. at 1375-79 (challenging collaborative law practitioners and theorists to
continue experimentation with cooperative law procedures).
133 See Lande & Herman, supra note 48, at 284.
134 Isaacs, supra note 29, at 835-36; Lande, supra note 1, at 1375.
135 See Lande & Herman, supra note 48, at 288.
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experimentation with this process may offer some guidance as to the
necessity of the disqualification provision, yet one theme remains clear.
Current rules of legal ethics were drafted without any conception of
collaborative law or the potential use of a disqualification agreement.
Consequently, attempts to force-fit the disqualification agreement into the
current ethical regime will continue to be unsatisfying.
4. Confidentiality
No principle of legal ethics is more fundamental than confidentiality. It is
the foundation upon which the attorney-client relationship is fostered. Absent
applicability of a specifically defined exception, Model Rule 1.6(a) presents
the basic command: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent. ' 136
Confidentiality is important for collaborative law in order to facilitate the
problem-solving discussions that will lead to dispute resolution. 137 In this
sense, collaborative law relies on confidentiality the same way that mediation
does. 138
Collaborative law procedures, however, are riddled with risks to
confidentiality. Participation agreements often include a duty to voluntarily
disclose relevant information. 139 Collaborative counsel may want to disclose
(or may have already disclosed at a four-way conference) confidential
information, such as the emotional state of the client, that the client does not
want revealed. Another potential pitfall involves the use of information or
documents gleaned from the collaborative process outside of the
collaborative proceedings. 140  Does voluntary disclosure within the
collaborative law setting permit its use outside of it? An even greater
problem might occur if the collaborative counsel follows the minority
practice of only conferring with the client in the presence of the opposing
party and counsel. Such a practice essentially removes all information from
under the cloak of attorney-client privilege.' 4 ' At the heart of all these
136 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004).
137 See Spain, supra note 72, at 168-78 (stressing the importance of confidentiality
to collaborative process).
138 See Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality:
Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 79-84 (2001)
(describing importance of confidentiality to mediation).
139 See, e.g., TESLER, supra note 5, at 137-42 (depicting a Collaborative Law
Retainer Agreement).
140 See Spain, supra note 72, at 169.
141 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 365.
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concerns is the fear that information, once disclosed, would be used later to
the client's detriment, especially in the context of failure to reach a
settlement.
Application of Model Rule 1.6 to the typical disclosure issue appears to
offer at least a framework for resolution. A client effectively waives
confidentiality by giving informed consent under Model Rule 1.6(a) to the
lawyer at the start of the representation. Such a wide prospective waiver of
confidentiality assumes a tremendously thorough job of obtaining informed
consent. Unfortunately, recent research indicates that failure to adequately
inform clients of disclosure issues already leads to some client
dissatisfaction. 142 It is questionable if informed consent as contemplated by
the Model Rules is possible under these circumstances. Notwithstanding any
blanket waiver, if a conflict between the client and counsel as to disclosure of
a particular issue arises, under Rule 1.6(a) the client wins barring counsel's
disclosure. 143 Counsel must then determine if provisions of the participation
agreement are invoked requiring termination of representation. 144 If the
disqualification provision is invoked, confidentiality issues remain as the
departing lawyer must determine what information can be disclosed to the
new counsel. 145
As one commentator notes, there may be a need for a specific privilege
for collaborative law along the lines of the mediation privilege. 146 North
Carolina already follows this approach: "All communications and work
product of any attorney or third-party expert hired for purposes of
142 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 209 (noting client complaints about disclosure
requirements).
143 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004).
144 See Schwab, supra note 6, at 365 (describing application of Rule 1.6).
145 See Spain, supra note 72, at 169 (linking disqualification and confidentiality
issues).
146 See id. (suggesting need to explore privilege). A mediation privilege is embodied
in the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA). The UMA was adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August 2001. The UMA
contains significant new provisions regarding confidentiality of mediation
communications and privilege against disclosure. See ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution, UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 (privilege against disclosure), 8 (confidentiality
and privilege), § 5 (waiver and preclusion of privilege), § 7 (exceptions to privilege), § 8
(confidentiality), § 9 (mediator disclosure) (2001), available at
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests. On May 13, 2003, Nebraska became the first state to
adopt the Uniform Mediation Act. Illinois followed. On November 22, 2004, New Jersey
followed suit. Ohio enacted the UMA in December 2004. On April 5, 2005, the
Washington legislature passed the UMA. Other jurisdictions considering bills to enact the
UMA include the following: Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, and Vermont.
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participating in a collaborative law procedure shall be privileged and
inadmissible in any court proceeding, except by agreement of the parties."'1 47
Alternatively, rules of procedure or ethics could clarify how certain
disclosures, such as documents, are to be treated with respect to
confidentiality and privilege. Given the importance of voluntary disclosure to
the collaborative process, reliance on informed consent or a prospective
waiver of confidentiality-without more-is simply insufficient to address
these ethical concerns.
B. Ethical Rules Specific to Collaborative Law
The general rules of ethics governing lawyers fail to take into account the
unique collaborative law process. Rather than read the tea leaves of the
Model Rules, collaborative lawyers have taken many steps to provide self-
governance. Collaborative law principles, guidelines, and standards exist at
the practice group level, with statewide groups, and even international
associations. Unwilling to rely on voluntary codes, some states codify rules
for collaborative law practice. These attempts, whether state-mandated or
self-imposed, illustrate a common theme-the need for creating separate
ethical rules for collaborative practice.
1. Self-governance
Attempts at collaborative law self-governance can be found at several
levels. 148 The most basic unit is the collaborative law practice group. There
are at least 87 such practice groups around the United States and Canada.1 49
These pockets of collaborative lawyers are the first line of the defense of
ethical practice. They may even serve a gatekeeping function on admission
into collaborative law practice in some areas.1 50 Presumably, members of a
practice group are the first to see ethical problems arising in practice and
have an opportunity to respond. However, placing too much reliance on
147 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-77 (2005). Texas also recently amended its
collaborative law provisions to include a confidentiality provision. See infra notes 208-
213 and accompanying text.
148 See Lande & Herman, supra note 48, at 281 ("In just the past few years, local
collaborative law groups have been developing their membership criteria and procedures
to increase the quality of collaborative law practice and provide quality assurances to
collaborative law consumers.").
149 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 62 (describing the New York Collaborative Law
Group).




practice groups policing their own as suggested by some commentators 151 is
unwise given the recent research demonstrating both a lack of ethics training
and general lack of recognition of ethics issues among collaborative
lawyers. 152
Some practice groups appear to rely on the text of their participation
agreement to sketch out the ethical parameters of the practice. For example,
the participation agreement of the New York Collaborative Law Group
provides some guidance on candor by requiring participants to "deal honestly
with each other" and provide financial information "that might be considered
important by the other, whether specifically requested or not."153 It contains
a disqualification provision that allows the process to be "terminated by our
counsel in the event we violate the terms or spirit of this agreement." 154
Further, the agreement requires lawyers and clients to "maintain the
confidentiality of all communication exchanged within the collaborative law
process."155
While the participation agreement may provide an ethical baseline, there
are obvious limitations. By design, the participation agreement is written to
inform the client of the obligations of collaborative law, not bind the lawyers
to an ethical code. 156 Consequently, the nuanced ethical issues implicated by
collaborative law cannot be adequately addressed. Important questions are
answered with generalities or omitted altogether. An example of this type of
omission in the agreement above exists concerning confidentiality. The
agreement calls for the use of joint experts, but is silent as to whether
information obtained from them through the collaborative law process is
cloaked with confidentiality. Additionally, differences in participation
agreements contribute to a lack of consensus on accepted ethical practice.
For example, the provision singling out financial information for automatic
151 See, e.g., id. (arguing self governance through reputation minimizes unethical
conduct).
152 Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 208. This finding is not surprising given that much
of the ethical message communicated by some practice groups boils down to simplistic
slogans. For example, the New York Collaborative Law Group's participation agreement
proclaims: "We pledge: Not Court, but Consensus; Not Combat, but Collaboration; Not
Coercion, but Cooperation." See The New York Collaborative Law Group, Collaborative
Law Participation Agreement, http://www.collaborativelawny.com/participationagreementphp (last
visited Oct. 21, 2005). While the alliteration is nice, the message is not a substitute for
ethical guidance.




156 See Peppet, supra note 50, at 494-95.
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disclosure-and presumably shielding all other information-is not present
in all participation agreements. Thus, the participation agreement is not a
substitute for an ethical code for collaborative lawyers.15 7
The Association of Collaborative Law Attorneys has developed the
closest thing to a true set of ethical rules for collaborative lawyers with its
"Principles and Guidelines for Collaborative Law. ' 158 These are widely
reproduced by collaborative law practice groups with some variations. 159
These Principles contain a mixture of procedural rules and aspirational
ethical goals limited exclusively to family law matters. 160 They do address
some of the core ethical issues presented by collaborative law, although not
always with clarity.161
Take for example compatibility with zealous advocacy. Principle 3.02
provides that "parties are still expected to protect their respective interests"
and "the parties may continue to act in their own best interests, and not in the
other party's interests, in areas which are outside the dispute, such as in
changing estate plans and in future financial and other activities." While the
rule is clear on permissible self-interest in areas outside the dispute, by
implication, the rule appears to require a party to act in the interests of the
other party on the core disputed questions.
The Principles are much clearer on the duty of candor requiring
"complete, full, honest and open disclosure of all information having a
material bearing on the case, whether requested or not."'162 All parties and
157 See id. (describing confusing and overly broad disqualification provisions in
participation agreements).
158 Association of Collaborative Law Attorneys, Principles and Guidelines for
Collaborative Law, http://www.nocourt.org/principles.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Principles]. The Principles were originally drafted by the Collaborative Law
Association in Santa Clara County, California, the predecessor of ACLA.
159 See Principles and Guidelines for the Practice of Collaborative Law,
http://www.mediate.com/pfriendly.cfn?id=474 (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) (labeling itself
an adaptation); San Francisco Collaborative Law Group, Statement of Principles of
Collaborative Law, http://www.collaborativelawsf.com/guidelines.htm (last visited Oct.
8, 2005); International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Statement of Principles
of Collaborative Law (on file with author) (superseded by new IACP Principles of
Collaborative Practice, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/articles/principles.pdf (last
visited Oct. 8, 2005)).
16 0 See Principles, supra note 158, at 1.01 (restricting Principles to family law).
161 Id. at 3.01 ("[W]e understand there is no guaranty of success .... While we all
are intent on striving to reach a cooperative and open solution, actual performance may
fall short."); id. at 4.01 ("[W]e agree to uphold a high standard of integrity."); id. at 12.01
("All parties, attorneys, and consulting professionals hereby pledge to comply with and to
promote the spirit and written word of this document.").
162 Id. at 2.01.
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professionals agree that they "shall not take advantage of inconsistencies,
misstatements of fact or law, or others' miscalculations, but shall disclose
them and seek to have them corrected."' 163 The full disclosure requirement is
paired with a commitment to "vigorous good faith negotiation. ' 164 These
provisions have teeth. Counsel "shall immediately withdraw" upon learning
that their client has knowingly withheld or misrepresented information
having a material bearing on the case." 165 There is also the expected
disqualification agreement triggered by the filing of adversary documents
with the court. 16 6
The ACLA's Principles attempt to serve as a comprehensive ethical
code. On some provisions, such as candor, the Principles speak with clarity,
but tend to micro-manage in the details. Other provisions suffer from
imprecise language. Because different associations appear to borrow freely
and even alter the Principles, there is a lack of uniformity manifesting in
significant differences on key issues. 167 The most problematic of these is the
level of duty owed to others in the collaborative law process. 168
Another source of ethical guidance comes from associations of
collaborative law professionals. These groups seek to embrace not only
lawyers, but also others-such as mental health professionals and financial
specialists-involved in a collaborative law case. Associations of
collaborative professionals have promulgated several different sets of ethical
guidelines with varying degrees of detail and usefulness. Consider first the
Ethical Guidelines for Collaborative Family Law recently revised by the
163 Id. at 4.01 (specifying what the reaction should be if an attorney discovers
misstatements by his client, consulting professionals, himself, or opposing counsel).
164 Id. at 6.01.
165 Id. at 7.01 (providing examples such as: secret disposition of property, failure to
disclose the existence or true nature of assets, on-going emotional or physical abuse, or
planning to flee with children).
166 Id. at 8.02 (disqualifying as witnesses all consultants and barring their work
product as inadmissible in court).
167 For example, the ACLA's Principles contain the immediate withdrawal
provision for knowingly withheld information and a separate provision noting the
ultimate sanction against lawyers abusing the collaborative law process is diminution of
the attorney's reputation, whereas other versions do not. Compare id. at 7.01-.02, with
Principles and Guidelines for the Practice of Collaborative Law, supra note 159 (omitting
the provisions).
168 Compare Principles, supra note 158, at 3.02 (implying duty to act in other
party's interest), with San Francisco Collaborative Law Group, Statement of Principles of
Collaborative Law, supra note 159, at III ("Although the participants are committed to
reaching a shared solution, each party is still expected to identify and assert his or her
respective interest and the parties' respective attorneys will help each of them do so.").
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Colorado Collaborative Law Professionals. 169 Much of the guidance in this
laundry list of provisions relates to the prevention of inter-professional
ethical concerns such as separation of fees and unauthorized practice outside
of one's respective discipline. 170 Unfortunately, many tough ethical issues
facing lawyers are avoided. For example, on the question of privilege, the
guidelines effectively punt declaring disclosure "shall follow both legal and
ethical guidelines by requiring written consent forms for release of privileged
information" without identifying what is privileged in the first place. 171
Similarly, the guidelines do nothing to resolve potential conflicts between
collaborative law and legal ethics. These guidelines require that "[a]ll
Collaborative Family Law team members must also adhere to the Code of
Ethics of their respective disciplines."' 172
Another interdisciplinary group, the International Academy of
Collaborative Professionals, is extremely active in promulgating standards
and principles. By May 2005, the IACP had adopted several separate
documents addressing collaborative professionals. 173 All of the standards are
aspirational, voluntary guidelines self-described as a "work-in-progress."'1 74
Adopted on January 24, 2005, the Principles of Collaborative Practice is a
narrative explaining the development of collaborative practice, which
involves a team of professionals, from collaborative law. 175 Collaborative
practice embraces the familiar tenets of settlement without court intervention,
withdrawal of professionals if either client goes to court, and open
169 See Colorado Collaborative Law Professionals, Ethical Guidelines for Collaborative
Family Law (Mar. 2004), http://cclawp.org/PDF/203%20M%2OEthicalGuidelines.pdf.
170 For example, the Guidelines state that "[e]ach discipline practices independently
from each other and all fees are set independently." Id. Also, "[n]o team member shall
receive financial remuneration for referring to another team member" and "[n]o team
member shall give advice outside of his or her training or expertise." Id.
171 Id
17 2 Id.
173 Three have direct relevance to lawyers: Principles of Collaborative Practice;
Minimum Standards for Collaborative Practitioners; and Ethical Standards for
Collaborative Practitioners. A fourth is Principles for Collaborative Trainers. The
previously-posted Statement of Principles of Collaborative Law (modeled after the
ACLA Principles) is now superseded by the new Principles of Collaborative Practice.
174 See International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Standards, Ethics and
Principles, Statement by IACP Standards Committee (May 2005),
http://www.collaborativepractice.com (go to "For Collaborative Professionals" pull-down
tab; highlight "About the IACP" link; then click on "Ethics & Standards" tab).
175 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Principles of Collaborative
Practice (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.collaborativepractice.com/articles/principles.pdf.
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communication and information sharing. 176 The IACP Principles, however,
are not a surrogate for ethical guidelines.
Similarly, the IACP Minimum Standards for Collaborative Practitioners
adopts training standards for collaborative team members. 77 The document
includes a section entitled IACP Minimum Standards for Collaborative
Lawyer Practitioners. These cryptic standards require a collaborative lawyer
to be in good standing in the jurisdiction and to be trained for a certain
number of hours in collaborative practice, client-centered facilitative problem
solving, and other related skills. 178 While these standards address the
important duty of competence, they are limited to this single ethical area. It is
also quite telling that while there is the Minimum Standards general
requirement that all collaborative practitioners diligently strive to be
consistent with the LACP Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners,
there is no requirement for any specific training on ethical issues. 179
The IACP Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners includes
provisions relating to lawyer behavior, as well as other collaborative
professionals.' 8 0 In the opening statement, the Ethical Standards state:
"Collaborative Practice differs greatly from adversarial dispute resolution
practice. It challenges practitioners in ways not necessarily addressed by the
ethics of individual disciplines. The following provides ethical guidelines to
address these challenges."'' 1 What follows is twenty-three standards
applicable to legal, mental health, and financial professionals, plus four
additional standards specific to collaborative practitioners assuming different
roles in the process. 182 The very first standard, however, severely limits the
usefulness for attorneys: "A Collaborative practitioner shall adhere to the
ethics of his or her respective discipline. Nothing in the following guidelines
shall be construed to contradict those standards." 183 Yet it is precisely the
compatibility between current legal ethical codes and collaborative law
176 Id.
177 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Minimum Standards for
Collaborative Practitioners (adopted July 13, 2004),
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/articles/IACPPractitionerStandards.pdf.
178 Id. at 2.1-4.
179 I. at 1.3.
180 International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, Ethical Standards for
Collaborative Practitioners (Jan. 24, 2005),
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/articles/EthicsStandardsfmal.pdf.
181 Id.
182 See id. Ethical Standards 24-27.
183 Id. Ethical Standard 1.
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mandates that cries out for attention and guidance. 184 Not surprisingly,
standards relating to confidentiality require adherence "to the rules of
confidentiality as they relate to that practitioner's discipline" and a duty to
fully inform the client about confidentiality in the specific collaborative
process chosen. 185 Practitioners shall reveal privileged information only with
the client's permission according to the participation agreement or "as
required by law."' 186 This does little to address the sticking points with
confidentiality. 187
In contrast, a complex web of termination and candor rules emerge. The
Ethical Standards include a disqualification provision applying to all
collaborative professionals triggered by threats of litigation or starting a
contested court proceeding. 188 If it is consistent with general ethics codes and
confidentiality, clients must agree to not "knowingly withhold or
misrepresent information material to the Collaborative process" or act to
undermine the process. 189 If a client knowingly withholds material
information or undermines the process as determined by a team member, it is
considered constructive termination of the process. 190 However, the next
standard seems to back away from the automatic termination by requiring a
team member who discovers such conduct to first advise and counsel the
client that the conduct violates the Ethical Standards. 191 "[P]ersistent
violation of such principles will mandate the withdrawal of the Collaborative
practitioner" and "in the discretion of the member" termination of the
collaborative process. 192 Another subsection reiterates that if a client persists
in violation of the "principles of disclosure and/or good faith," the team
member will withdraw and notify the other members of termination of the
process. 193 Interestingly, this section is the first mention of a duty of candor
and good faith.194
1 84 See supra Part [V.A.
185 See Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners, supra note 180, Ethical
Standards 2-3.
186 Id. Ethical Standard 4.
187 See supra Part IV.A.4 (outlining issues of confidentiality in collaborative law).
188 Ethical Standards for Collaborative Practitioners, supra note 180, Ethical
Standard 9.
189 Id. Ethical Standard 10(b).
190 Id. Ethical Standard 10(c)-(d).
191 Id. Ethical Standard I1 (a)-(b).
192 Id. Ethical Standard 11 (b).
193 Id. Ethical Standard 11.1.1(a)-(b).
194 Id. Ethical Standard 10(a) (requiring the client to adhere to "basic principles and
guidelines for Collaborative Practice"). The Principles of Collaborative Practice includes
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While the IACP has diligently promulgated a variety of voluntary
guidelines, even their Ethical Standards is not a model that can be adapted to
general use. The Ethical Standards fall short for the same reasons described
for the Ethical Guidelines of the Colorado Collaborative Law Professionals.
The major focus is on interdisciplinary collaboration, not lawyer ethics. By
requiring continued compliance with current codes of ethics in each
profession, the Ethical Standards cannot effectively guide collaborative
lawyers on the issues in tension with the current Model Rules. Where legal
ethics are addressed, content is underdeveloped, excessively detailed, or
internally confusing.
2. State Statutes
Another potential source for ethical guidance comes from the handful of
states that have codified collaborative law, often blending both collaborative
procedure and ethics. In 2001, Texas became the first state to adopt
collaborative law procedures by incorporating them into the Texas Family
Code-making it available for marriage dissolution proceedings and suits
affecting the parent-child relationship. 195 The statute focuses primarily on
procedure and the contents of the participation agreement. Attorney ethics,
however, are impacted by these requirements. For example, a collaborative
dissolution of marriage must be initiated by a written agreement of the
parties and attorneys thus highlighting the importance of informed
consent.196
Under the statute, collaborative law is defined as a procedure in which
the parties and their attorneys agree in writing to "use their best efforts and
make a good faith attempt" to resolve their dissolution 197 without resorting to
a paragraph on the importance of freely disclosing all relevant information and the
"commitment to full disclosure." Principles of Collaborative Practice, supra note 175.
195 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (marriage dissolution proceedings), § 153.0072
(suits affecting the parent-child relationship) (Vernon 2005) (effective Sept. 1, 2001).
Identical provisions for collaborative law were codified in two places-one for
dissolution of marriage and the other for suits affecting the parent-child relationship. For
convenience a single citation to the dissolution chapter is used. The rise of collaborative
family law in Texas is truly meteoric; Stuart Webb and Pauline Tesler first presented the
model to Texas practitioners in Dallas in February 2000. See Gay G. Cox & Robert J.
Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 45, 46-47 (2004)
(describing the introduction of collaborative law in Texas).
19 6 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(a).
197 Id. § 153.0072(b) (substituting "a suit affecting the parent-child relationship" for
the dissolution language).
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judicial intervention. 198 Further, the "'parties' counsel may not serve as
litigation counsel except to ask the court to approve the settlement
agreement."' 199 Thus, in the definition alone, the statute has a heightened duty
of candor with the best efforts/good faith requirement and it permits the
disqualification provision potentially at odds with the rules of termination.
Support for these provisions is reiterated in a list of five mandatory
provisions in a collaborative law agreement: (1) full and candid exchange of
information between the parties and their attorneys; (2) suspension of court
intervention while the collaborative process in ongoing; (3) hiring of joint
experts; (4) withdrawal of all counsel if the collaborative process does not
end in settlement; and (5) other provisions consistent with a good faith effort
to settle.200
The remainder of the collaborative law statute deals with procedural
items such as entitlement to judgment if the settlement agreement
prominently displays a boldfaced, capitalized, or underlined statement that
the agreement is irrevocable. 20 1 There are also specific limitations on judicial
action if the court is notified in advance that collaborative law is being
used.202 Finally, the statute includes a couple of provisions relating to the
procedure for notifying the court of success or failure, as well as status
reports.203
Texas continues to pursue statutory implementation of collaborative law.
Building on the success in settling domestic disputes, collaborative law
supporters introduced Texas House Bill No. 205 on January 11, 2005.204 The
bill would amend the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code to make
collaborative law available for all disputes. 20 5 The text of the bill is
198 Id. § 6.603(b). There are exceptions for approving the settlement, making the
legal pronouncements, and signing orders to effectuate the agreement. Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. § 6.603(c)(l)-(5).
201 Id. § 6.603(d).
202 Id. § 6.603(e). Until the court is notified that the collaborative process did not
end in settlement, it cannot set a hearing or trial date, impose discovery deadlines, require
compliance with scheduling orders, or dismiss the case. Id.
203 Id. § 6.603(f)-(g).
204 H.B. 205, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); see ADRWorld.com, Texas Bill
Reflects Growing Support for Collaborative Law, Jan. 13, 2005,
http://www.adrworld.com (search for "Texas Bill Reflects Growing Support for
Collaborative Law"; then follow "Texas Bill Reflects Growing Support for Collaborative
Law" hyperlink) (describing family law success as motivation for expanding use).
205 See H.B. 205, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess., Sec. 1 (Tex. 2005) ("On a written




essentially identical to the current provisions relating to collaborative law's
use in dissolution of marriage and suits affecting the parent-child relationship
with one substantive ethical change. H.B. 205 includes a final subsection
that would make the confidentiality provisions currently in place for other
forms of alternative dispute resolution applicable to collaborative law.206 The
bill is currently pending before the House Committee on Civil Practices. 20 7
While the fate of H.B. 205 is uncertain, the confidentiality provision is
now law. Effective June 18, 2005, Texas amended the Family Code to apply
the provisions for confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution as provided
in the Civil Practices and Remedies Code to collaborative law
proceedings. 20 8 The general confidentiality provision states:
[A] communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or
criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution
procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial
proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be
used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative
proceeding. 209
Additionally, any record made at an ADR procedure is confidential, and
the participants or third party facilitating the procedure may not be required
to testify in any proceeding relating to the dispute or be subject to process
requiring disclosure of confidential information or data arising out of the
matter in dispute.210  There are exceptions for material discovered
independent of the procedure, reportable abuse and neglect, and certain
agreements with government entities.2 1 1 There is also a provision for in
camera inspection and judicial determination if material is subject to
206 See id. § 2 (amending § 153.0072 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to
apply to § 6.603 (dissolution) and § 153.0072 (suits affecting parent-child relationship)).
207 Supporters of H.B. 205 expected approval during the legislative session due to
the support for it among civil lawyers. See Texas Bill Reflects Growing Support for
Collaborative Law, supra note 204. However, with the Texas legislature in the midst of
its perennial school funding crisis, it appears likely that the bill will not emerge from
committee.
208 See Act effective June 18, 2005, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 916, § 1, 2005 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 916 (Vernon) (To be codified as an amendment to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.603(h)) ("The provisions for confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution
procedures as provided in Chapter 154, Civil Practices and Remedies Code, apply equally
to collaborative law procedures under this section.").
209 TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (Vernon 2005).
2 1
°Id. § 154.073(b).
211 Id. § 154.073(c), (d), (f).
105
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disclosure or protection.212 The application of these confidentiality
provisions to collaborative law is a major attempt to address ethical concerns
raised about the use of the process.213
North Carolina became the second state to enact provisions allowing for
collaborative law proceedings for divorce cases in 2003.214 This statute
follows closely on the heels of the 2002 formal ethics opinion of the North
Carolina State Bar approving the use of collaborative law in family law
disputes. 215 The North Carolina definition of collaborative law is the same as
the Texas statute-an agreement by the parties and their attorneys to use
their best efforts and make a good faith attempt to resolve their dispute
without resort to judicial intervention.216 However, when establishing the
agreement requirements, North Carolina takes a minimalist approach. A
collaborative law agreement must be in writing and signed by the parties and
counsel, but the only specific content requirement is that it includes
provisions for the withdrawal of all attorneys if the process does not achieve
settlement. 217 Notably absent is the requirement of full and candid exchange
of information.
The North Carolina statute is also weighted heavily toward procedural
requirements, some similar to the Texas statute while others are novel. Like
Texas, notice to the court that collaborative law is being used prevents
judicial action until the court receives written notice of failure to settle,
voluntary dismissal, or a request for the entry of judgment. 218 A party is
entitled to entry of judgment to effectuate the settlement terms if the
agreement is signed by each party.219 Of course, the collaborative attorneys
are disqualified from representing either party in further civil proceedings. 220
North Carolina's collaborative law statute breaks from the Texas model
by adding a provision for tolling of all limitations periods and deadlines
2 1 2 Id. § 154.073(e).
213 See Texas Bill Reflects Growing Support for Collaborative Law, supra note 204
(noting that bill supporters say it will serve as an educational tool, give the process added
legitimacy, and show critics that this is good legal practice).
214 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to 50-79 (2005).
215 See N.C. Formal Eth. Op. 1, supra note 123 (finding collaborative law for family
law disputes can be consistent with Rules of Professional Conduct).
216 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71(1) (defining collaborative law).
217 Id. § 50-72 (listing agreement requirements).
2 18 Id. § 50-74(b). No notice must be given if the collaborative agreement is entered
into prior to the filing of a civil action. Id. § 50-74(a).
2 19 Id. § 50-75. North Carolina does not include a requirement of emphasis or magic
words as to the irrevocability of the agreement. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(d)
(Vernon 2005).
220 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-76(c).
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while the participation agreement is in effect and a survivorship provision.22 1
The statute also explicitly recognizes that the parties can use other forms of
alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation or arbitration. 222 The parties
can even use their collaborative counsel for other forms of ADR provided for
in the participation agreement. 223
Until Texas's recent application of confidentiality to collaborative law,
North Carolina took the vanguard position to ensure confidentiality and
privilege. North Carolina imposes a broad cloak: "All statements,
communications, and work product made or arising from a collaborative law
procedure are confidential and are inadmissible in any court proceeding."
224
"Work product includes written or verbal communications or analysis of any
third-party experts used in the collaborative law process." 225 All
communications and work product of any attorney or third-party expert
participating in the collaborative process are also privileged and inadmissible
in any court proceeding, except by agreement of the parties.226 While North
Carolina no longer stands alone in its treatment of confidentiality, the North
Carolina protection is broader than Texas's because North Carolina explicitly
extends confidentiality, inadmissibility, and privilege to cover third-party
experts.227
Given the relevant infancy of collaborative law, the move to statutory
permanence by Texas and North Carolina signals both the level of interest in
using the collaborative law process and the heightened concern about its
compatibility with existing legal ethics rules. Other states, such as New
Jersey, may soon follow the Texas and North Carolina models.228 While the
statutory approach can add clarity on some ethical questions, the current
focus of statutory collaborative law is on procedure and process. One must
turn to the opinions of state ethics committees to find an answer to the
question of compatibility of collaborative law with current ethics rules. This
shallow pool of advisory opinions, however, merely reflects the need for a
more dramatic rule-based solution.
221 Id. § 50-73 (tolling of time periods); 50-79 (collaborative law procedures
surviving death).
222 Id. § 50-78.
223 Id.
2 2 4 Id. § 50-77(a).
225 Id.
226 Id. § 50-77(b).
227 Compare id. § 50-77, with TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073.
228 See Assemb. B. No. 3375, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (proposing to establish
collaborative divorce modeled after the Texas and North Carolina statutes).
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3. State Ethics Opinions
Recently, the ethics committees of three state bar associations-
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Kentucky-considered collaborative law
and its compatibility with the jurisdiction's ethical rules. Their conclusions
reflect a mixed reception on the ethical use of collaborative law under current
rules. Moreover, these opinions are inherently advisory in nature and do not
purport to be the last word on the subject. Nonetheless, they reflect the
ongoing struggle collaborative law faces under the current ethical rules.
Consider first the recent informal opinion of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility on
collaborative law authored by Professor Laurel Terry of Penn State-
Dickinson School of Law.229 The Committee was asked the general question
of whether the practice of collaborative law in a domestic relations context is
ethical provided clients are given full disclosure regarding all methods for
resolving their dispute and the rights waived by choosing the collaborative
law method.230 The request had the unusual inclusion of 61 pages of
materials, most apparently gleaned from continuing legal education course
materials.231 The request even failed to include a definition of collaborative
law.232 The Committee ultimately interpreted the letter request as posing the
following question: "Do the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct
create a per se ban on using a collaborative law process in a domestic
relations case?" 233
The opinion weighed into the compatibility of collaborative law in
multiple contexts including the following: client identity, Rule 1.7 and
conflicts, Rule 1.1 and competence, 234 Rule 1.2 and scope of representation,
Rule 1.5(b) and written agreements about scope of representation, 235 Rule
229 See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. Leg. Eth. & Prof 1 Resp., Informal Op. 2004-24
(2004), available at 2004 WL 2758094 [hereinafter Pa. Informal Op. 2004-24.
230 Id. at * 1.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at *2. Even as framed above, Professor Terry was handicapped by the lack of
specificity of the request. Terry lamented this problem in the opinion itself noting the
recent contributions by John Lande and Julie Macfarlane and the different ways to
structure a collaborative law agreement that might be dispositive. See id.
234 Terry recommends "that when you have a specific client and a specific situation,
you carefully consider the interplay between Rule 1.2(c) and Rule 1.1 and make sure that
you are satisfied that you are able to provide competent representation." Id. at *8.
235 Even though the Pennsylvania rules do not require a written agreement for




7.5 and joint advertising,236 Rule 1.16 and withdrawal, Rule 1.2(a) and
client's right to settle, 237 Rule 1.7 and nonconsentable conflicts of interest,238
and prospective waiver of liability.239 While "not prepared to say that using
some kind of collaborative law process in a domestic relations context is a
per se violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct,"
Professor Terry urged careful consideration of the Rules before going
forward.240
Particularly troubling to Terry were the issues of client identity, multiple
representations, and Rule 1.7 conflicts; limitations on representation under
Rule 1.2; and Rule 1.16 termination. These issues, which go to the core of
collaborative law, underscore the tension with current rules models. For
example, Terry is troubled by the threshold question of client identity. She
rejects the concept of "lawyer for the situation" and notes the imperative of
clearly identifying the client represented. 241 To the extent that multiple
clients are involved and those are two spouses in a contemplated divorce,
Terry finds compatibility with Rule 1.7(b) necessary and problematic.242
Additionally, relying upon the recent research of John Lande243 and Julie
Macfarlane, 244 Terry believes that the interplay between Rule 1.2(c)
236 Terry concludes that it is unclear whether joint advertising might lead a court to
impute conflicts within a CL group but that careful consideration of the issue was
necessary. See id. at *9-10.
237 Terry instructs that preparation and enforcement of the retainer agreement musty
keep Rule 1.2(a) in mind and" ensure that the client understands that it is the client's
decision whether to settle." Id. at * 13.
238 Terry recommends keeping "Rule 1.7 in mind and consider whether there are
any conflicts between the client's interests and your interest in practicing collaborative
law." Id. at * 14.
239 Terry concludes that one portion of the materials included for review contained a
misleading statement as to prospective waivers. Id. The materials stated that the client has
a right to independent counsel. Id. Pennsylvania rules require the client to actually have
independent counsel when prospectively waiving malpractice claims. Id.; see PA. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h)(1).
240 See Pa. Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 229, at *2.
241 Id. at *3.
242 "In my view, it is not at all clear whether the objective element of Rule 1.7(b)(1)
could be satisfied if you represented both husband and wife in pre-litigation divorce
negotiations .... My personal view would be to find this element not satisfied and
prohibit dual representation of a divorcing husband and wife. I believe that the risks are
too large and the lawyer may not be able to effectively judge when he or she is favoring
one spouse." Id. at *4.
243 See generally Lande, supra note 1.
244 See generally Macfarlane, supra note 22.
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(limitations on scope of representation) and Rule 1.1 (duty of competence)
requires careful consideration of the specific situations of specific clients.245
As for compatibility with the Rule 1.16 (the termination/withdrawal
rule), Terry posits multiple difficulties. First, there is an open question as to
whether Rule 1.16 even applies.246 As Terry explains, Rule 1.16 applies if
one considers the termination agreement inherent in collaborative law as a
withdrawal from representation. 247 In contrast, if the situation is one in which
the matter for which the lawyer was retained naturally concludes, Rule 1.16
need not be followed.248 Because of this fundamental problem, Terry
recommends the conservative approach of compliance with Rule 1.16.249
Compliance, however, may be difficult. Of particular importance is
complying with one of the permissive withdrawal provisions of Rule
1.16(b). 250 Without deciding the issue, Terry concludes that compliance with
Rule 1.16 (c) (seeking permission from the court if an appearance has been
made) and 1.16(d) (taking reasonable steps post-withdrawal to protect
client's interests) are essential. 251 Additionally, she recommends that the
withdrawing lawyer consider why there are grounds for the withdrawal under
either the mandatory or permissive provisions of Rule 1.16.252
The limitation on the usefulness of the Pennsylvania Informal Opinion in
providing answers to the ethical questions raised by collaborative law is
obvious. The opinion does not actually answer most of the key issues
presented, but merely flags them for lawyer consideration. Even this type of
analysis is not controlling. The caveat at the conclusion of the opinion
explicitly recognizes the limitation:
The foregoing opinion is advisory only and is not binding on the
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or any court. It
carries only such weight as an appropriate reviewing authority may choose.
Moreover, this is the opinion of only one member of the committee and is
not an opinion of the full committee. 25 3
245 See Pa. Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 229, at *7.
246 Id. at *10-12.
24 7 Id. at *10-11.
248 Id.
249 See id.
25 0 Id. at *11-12.
251 Id at *12.
2 5 2 Id.
253 Id. at *15.
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Professor Terry, however, does recognize a potential solution: Because
"collaborative law involves a paradigm shift," it may be "appropriate to have
a separate ethics rule or rules for collaborative law lawyers." 254
In 2002, the North Carolina State Bar Association issued a formal ethics
opinion concerning lawyer participation "in a non-profit organization that
promotes a cooperative method for resolving family law disputes although
the client is required to make full disclosure and the lawyer is required to
withdraw before court proceedings commence." 255 Despite the lengthy
description, the inquiry was clearly about the use of collaborative law to
facilitate resolution of family law disputes. Unlike the informal Pennsylvania
opinion, the North Carolina State Bar answered discrete questions. These
answers, however, illustrate the complexity of finding ethical guidance in
this field.
First, the North Carolina opinion addressed whether a lawyer who is a
member of a collaborative family law group could represent a spouse if
another member represents the other spouse.256 With little explanation, the
opinion concludes: "Yes, provided both lawyers determine that their
professional judgment on behalf of their respective clients will not be
impaired by their relationship to the other lawyer through the CFL
Organization, and both clients consent to the representation after
consultation." 257 While the Pennsylvania opinion found compliance with
Rule 1.7(b) problematic, North Carolina sees no such complexity.
This cryptic approach continues as the North Carolina State Bar
considered advance agreements limiting the scope of lawyer services. The
opinion matter-of-factly declares: "Rule 1.2(c) permits a lawyer to limit the
objectives of a representation if the client consents after consultation."258
Similarly as to advertising, the formal opinion concludes that brochures
describing the collaborative family law approach are permissible provided
they are truthful and not misleading under Rule 7.1.259 This includes
contacting the other spouse, if not represented by counsel, to suggest use of
the collaborative law process. 260
On the core issue of voluntary disclosure and its compatibility with the
duty of competence, the North Carolina State Bar opinion offers little
concrete analysis. It concludes "the lawyer must use his or her professional
254 Id. at *2.
255 N.C. Formal Eth. Op. 1, supra note 123, at *1.
256 Id.
25 7 Id. (citing N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)).
258 Id.
259 Id. at *2.
260 Id.
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judgment to analyze the benefits and risks for the client in participating in the
collaborative family law process, taking the disclosure requirements into
consideration, and advise the client accordingly."'261 When directly asked
about a disclosure requirement that permits withholding information about
adultery even though the general policy is of full disclosure, the opinion
provides another nebulous response:
A lawyer may represent a client in the collaborative family law process
if it is in the best interest of the client, the client has made informed
decisions about the representation, the disclosure requirements do not
involve dishonesty or fraud, and all parties understand and agree to the
specific disclosure requirements. 2 62
This includes a risk and benefits analysis by the lawyer and client of
making and receiving certain disclosures (or not receiving those
disclosures). 263 Interestingly, the North Carolina State Bar opinion does not
consider the key termination or withdrawal issue at all.
The Kentucky Bar Association recently issued a more thorough
examination of the compatibility of collaborative law with ethical rules in
June 2005.264 At the request of Collaborative Law of Central Kentucky, Inc.,
a nonprofit organization of lawyers promoting the use of collaborative law,
the Kentucky Bar Association explored the intersection of the Kentucky
Rules of Professional Conduct and collaborative family law. 265 Similar to the
Pennsylvania example, extensive materials about the development of
collaborative law were presented to the ethics committee. 266 The Kentucky
Bar Association, however, took great care in describing collaborative law to




264 Ky. Bar Ass'n Eth. Comm., Op. E-425 (2005), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics opinions/kba e-425.pdf [hereinafter Ky. Op. E-
425]; see Concept of Collaborative Lawyering Receives Qualified Approval in Kentucky,
21 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 453 (2005).
265 Although the opinion notes the use of collaborative law in resolving other
disputes, it limited its discussion to family law noting that "[c]ollaborative law is used
primarily in family law cases." Ky. Op. E-425, supra note 264, at 2.
266 Id.
267 The opinion states as follows:
The goal of the collaborative law process is to reach an agreement through a
cooperative process. It is based upon a problem-solving model rather than an
adversarial model and tends to focus on the future, rather than the past; on
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Before even addressing the specific inquiries, the ethics committee sua
sponte offered what it described as "three very important observations. 268
First, "the collaborative law agreement between a lawyer and the client
cannot alter the lawyer's ethical obligations under the Rules of Professional
Conduct. '269 Second, because the lawyer's duty of competency, "[a] lawyer
cannot advise a client to use the collaborative process without assessing
whether it is truly in the client's best interest. '270 Third, "because the
relationship between the lawyer and the client is different from what would
normally be expected, the lawyer has a heightened obligation to
communicate with the client regarding the representation and the special
implications of collaborative law process."'271 These heightened obligations
were grounded on the premise that the collaborative process is "dramatically
different from the adversarial process." 272
The first issue addressed by the Kentucky ethics opinion is whether a
lawyer could participate in an agreement requiring full disclosure. 273 The
opinion rejects any potential violation of the so-called duty of zealous
representation because no such duty exists under Kentucky's Rules of
Professional Conduct.274 Rather, the Rules impose duties of competence and
diligence.275 These requirements do not prohibit nonadversarial forms of
representation. Indeed, if the client's objective is to "obtain a divorce in the
most amicable way possible, then it is incumbent upon the lawyer to help the
relationships rather than facts; and on rebuilding relationships rather than finding
fault. As part of the collaborative law process, the lawyers and the parties are
normally expected to sign an agreement setting forth the rules of the negotiations
and the expectations of the parties. Each party has separate representation. All agree
to open, face-to-face negotiations with both lawyers and clients present (four-way
negotiations). The formal discovery process is eliminated, but the parties agree to
full and timely disclosure of all material information and to act in good faith. If a
lawyer learns that his or her client has acted in bad faith or withheld or
misrepresented information, the agreement encourages the lawyer to withdraw. If
the dispute cannot be resolved through the collaborative process, it is agreed that the
lawyers will withdraw and will not participate in subsequent litigation involving the
same or substantially related matter.
Id.





273 Id. at 4.
274 Id.
275 Id.; see KY. SuP. CT. RULEs 3.130, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1; 1.3.
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client find the means to accomplish that goal." 27 6 Thus, the opinion gives a
qualified yes to the first issue.
The second issue the opinion examines is withdrawal by the lawyer if the
client withholds or misrepresents information. 277 Grounding its analysis in
Rule 1.16, the opinion notes that withdrawal would be permitted if the client
insists on pursuing an objective the lawyer deems repugnant or imprudent or
the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer after
reasonable warning.278 Consequently, the opinion concludes that "[i]f the
client is violating one of the core provisions of the collaborative agreement,
which both the lawyer and the client have signed, it would appear that the
lawyer has the right to withdraw under one of the above provisions." 279 The
opinion also addresses the fact that the lawyer must withdraw under certain
mandatory circumstances as required by the Rules, and it approves of the
process of noisy withdrawal under certain circumstances. 280
The Kentucky Bar Association also explores the compatibility of the
disqualification provision with Rule 5.6 and its prohibition on agreements
restricting a lawyer's right to practice as part of an employment agreement or
settlement of a controversy between parties.281 The opinion makes swift
work of this issue by concluding that the disqualification agreement "is not
the kind of restrictive covenant contemplated by Rule 5.6."282 The ethics
committee adds that Rule 1.2 on limitation of the objectives of representation
also requires that the client be properly informed and consent to the
limitation, including explanation of the costs incurred by disqualification. 283
The final issue the opinion considers relates to the formation of
collaborative law groups, solicitation, and advertising.284 On these issues, the
ethics committee provides no guidance except to say that lawyers are free to
act consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct. 285 Refusing to
276 Ky. Op. E-425, supra note 264, at 5. The opinion quotes at length from Sheila
M. Gutterman, a collaborative law practitioner credited with founding collaborative law
in Colorado. Id.
277 Id.
278 Id;see KY. SUP. CT. RULES 3.130, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16.
279 Ky. Op. E-425, supra note 264, at 5. Of course, the lawyer must comply with
Rule 1.16(c) and (d) requiring court approval if an appearance has been made and taking
steps to protect the client's interest following termination. Id. at 5-6.
280 Id. at 6-7.
281 See KY. SUP. CT. RULEs 3.130, RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6.
282 Ky. Op. E-425, supra note 264, at 7.
283 Id.




speculate, the ethics committee hints that the Kentucky Advertising
Commission is better suited to address such questions.286
In sum, the Kentucky Bar Association gives tentative approval to the use
of collaborative family law and its compatibility with the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct. "In the final analysis, there may be situations where
the collaborative process will serve the interests of the client and will not
create ethical dilemmas for the lawyer. '287 Despite this approval, the Bar
Association maintains a cautionary tone. "Any lawyer who engages in the
collaborative process must proceed with the utmost caution in order to avoid
all potential ethical pitfalls. '288 Moreover, this formal opinion, like the others
discussed in this section, are only advisory.289
While the sample is small, the examination of the compatibility of
collaborative law with the rules of ethics undertaken by state ethics
committees is instructive. First, the sheer volume of potential ethical rules
implicated by collaborative law is striking, as the Pennsylvania and Kentucky
opinions amply demonstrate. 290 Second, there is a notable lack of consensus
as to which specific rules are implicated. For example, the key termination or
withdrawal issue is analyzed by Pennsylvania under Rule 1.16 and Rule 1.2,
whereas Kentucky viewed it primarily under Rule 5.6 and Rule 1.2;291 North
Carolina omitted the issue all together.292 Even when there is agreement on
what ethical rule applies, the analysis of the ethics committees often
conflicts. Consequently, Pennsylvania finds compliance with Rule 1.7 on
conflicts both essential and problematic while North Carolina breezed
through the issue in a single sentence. 293 Kentucky does not even address the
conflicts issue. Thus, the limited analysis by state ethics committees fails to
yield consensus on even what questions to ask, much less the answer. With
major ethical questions remaining unanswered, the stage is set for a superior
286 Id.
287 Id. at 9.
2 88 Id.
2 8 9 Id.; see Ky. SUP. CT. R. 3.530.
290 See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text (noting plethora of ethical rules
considered by Pennsylvania); Ky. Op. E-425, supra note 264, at 1 (noting consideration
of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.6. 1.16, 2.1, 2.2, 5.6, and 8.3).
291 The Kentucky Bar Association opinion considered Rule 1.16 but only on the
limited question of termination or withdrawal for failure of the client to disclose
information. See Ky. Op. E-425, supra note 264, at 5.
292 Compare Pa. Informal Op. 2004-24, supra note 229, at *10- 12, with Ky. Op. E-
425, supra note 264, at 7-8, with N.C. Formal Eth. Op. 1, supra note 123.
293 See supra note 242 and accompanying text (describing Pennsylvania application
of Rule 1.7); supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text (describing North Carolina
application of the same rule).
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approach to resolve the ethical issues surrounding collaborative law-an
amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
V. A NEW MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
A. Why a Model Rule?
First adopted in 1983, the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct remain the chief source of ethical rules. Most states
have adopted codes based on the Model Rules. 294 As such, it makes sense to
integrate a proposed ethical rule concerning collaborative law into the Model
Rules if possible. 295 While the precise placement of a new Model Rule is not
294 Oregon is the most recent convert, adopting new rules based on the Model Rules
effective January 1, 2005. See OREGON RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2005), available at
http://www.osbar.org/_docs/rulesregs/ORPC.pdf. Forty-five jurisdictions now follow a
Model Rules based ethical code. This includes forty-four states and the District of
Columbia. For a comprehensive listing and websites addresses for each state code see
ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT § 1:3 (2005) (Model
Standards/State Ethics Rules). In contrast, the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility is of dwindling relevancy. Only a handful of states retain professional
rules based on the older Model Code. The holdouts include: Iowa, Nebraska, New York,
and Ohio. See id. California and Maine do not follow either the Model Code or Model
Rules. Id.
At least one of these jurisdictions is on the verge of shifting to the Model Rules
format. Ohio adopted the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility on October 6, 1970,
basically enacting the ABA's Model Code. On March 10, 2003, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Ohio announced the creation of a special Task Force on the Rules of
Professional Conduct. The eighteen-member Task Force is charged with engaging in
comprehensive review of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct, the Model Rules, and
the ABA Ethics 2000 revisions. The Task Force will ultimately file a report with the
Supreme Court as to what revisions should be made in Ohio. The Task Force has just
completed the public comment stage on the last batch of proposed rules. According to the
Task Force, "[b]y adopting the Model Rules, Ohio will become more relevant in national
discussions on the subject of legal ethics. See Supreme Court Task Force on Rules of
Professional Conduct, Frequently Asked Questions (May 2005), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Atty-Svcs/ProfConduct/faq.doc. A draft of the proposed
rules is available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Atty_Svcs/ProfConduct/proposal/default.asp.
295 Professor Peppet discusses the relative merits of context-specific codes
compared to Model Rules in his recent article where he ultimately advances his new
contract model of legal ethics. See Peppet, supra note 50, at 511-14. The solution
proposed by this article is a compromise that sacrifices greater detail (that would be
available in a stand-alone code of ethics) in favor of maintaining the unifying advantages
of placement in the Model Rules. Whether this places me in the "cottage industry" of
producers of context-specific codes is uncertain. In other contexts, I have been a staunch
advocate for transsubstantive rules. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened
[Vol. 21:1 20051
COLLABORATIVE LAW
a priority issue, there is a convenient home. In 2002, Model Rule 2.2 relating
to lawyers as intermediaries was eliminated. This leaves a welcoming spot-
and in an appropriate part of the Rules-for this proposal to slip in to. The
text of proposed new Rule 2.2 relating to collaborative law follows.
B. Proposed Model Rule 2.2 and Comments
Rule 2.2 The Collaborative Lawyer
(a) A lawyer may serve as a collaborative lawyer. Collaborative law is
a procedure in which the parties and their lawyers agree to use their best
efforts and participate in good faith to resolve a dispute on an agreed basis
without resorting to judicial intervention. An agreement to use collaborative
law must be the result of informed consent, confirmed in writing, with
terms that can be reasonably understood by the parties, and signed by all
parties and their lawyers.
(b) A collaborative lawyer shall be competent by training and
experience to engage in collaborative representation.
(c) While all collaborative lawyers engaged in resolving a dispute share
a common commitment to the collaborative law process, a collaborative
lawyer represents the client who has retained the collaborative lawyer's
services.
(d) A collaborative lawyer shall facilitate the resolution of all issues in
the dispute using cooperative strategies, instead of adversarial techniques. A
collaborative lawyer shall not initiate or threaten to initiate any contested
court procedure.
(e) A collaborative lawyer shall make a voluntary, full, honest, and
open disclosure of all relevant information that a reasonable decision maker
would need to make an informed decision about each issue in the dispute.
(f) All information arising from and relating to a collaborative
representation is confidential including any written or verbal
communications or analysis of any third-party experts used in the
collaborative law process.
(g) A collaborative lawyer shall withdraw from representation if:
Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REv. 551, 622-23 (2002) (rejecting heightened pleading in part due
to transsubstantivity advantages). I believe that modifying the existing Model Rules to
accommodate collaborative law is not wholly inconsistent with this view.
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(1) either party chooses to litigate;
(2) the parties do not reach a settlement through the collaborative
law process or other forms of alternative dispute resolution mutually agreed
upon by the parties; or
(3) either party knowingly withholds or misrepresents information
having a material bearing on the case or otherwise acts to undermine the
collaborative law process.
Following withdrawal, the collaborative lawyer shall assist the client in
selection of new counsel.
COMMENT
[1] Collaborative lawyering is a distinct representational role. A
collaborative lawyer is not a traditional advocate zealously asserting the
client's position under the rules of an adversary system. Nor is the
collaborative lawyer merely acting as a negotiator seeking an advantageous
result for the client. While a collaborative lawyer is helping the parties to
resolve a dispute, the lawyer is still engaged in a representational role and is
not serving as a third party neutral. A lawyer acts as a collaborative lawyer
under this Rule when, in the context of a dispute, the lawyers and their
clients mutually agree to use collaborative law procedures to resolve the
issues between the clients. Collaborative law is a form of voluntary conflict
resolution designed to minimize the negative economic, social, and
emotional consequences often associated with the adversarial process. A
lawyer who undertakes collaborative representation must be committed to
not only avoiding litigation, but in fostering an atmosphere of honesty and
cooperation conducive to resolving the issues in dispute justly and
equitably.
[2] Collaborative law not only involves an orientation away from
adversarial techniques and litigation, but requires a voluntary limitation on
the scope of representation between lawyers and clients. Consequently, it is
essential that the client's decision to use collaborative law is the result of
fully informed written consent, signed by all parties and lawyers. This is
typically done through the use of a participation agreement, drafted with
terms that can be reasonably understood by all parties, and that specifically
delineates the collaborative law process.
[3] Collaborative lawyers have a duty to use their best efforts and
participate in good faith to resolve a dispute without resorting to judicial
intervention and to ensure their clients do the same. While the collaborative
lawyer is committed to settlement through the collaborative process, there is
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no guarantee of success. Collaborative lawyers and their clients must strive
to reach a cooperative solution, but realize that the process may fall short.
[4] A collaborative lawyer's duty to avoid adversarial legal proceedings
does not preclude the collaborative lawyer from complying with applicable
requirements to provide notice to the court of participation in the
collaborative law process, obtain orders to effectuate a collaborative law
participation agreement or a settlement agreement, or similar noncontested
court procedure.
[5] A collaborative lawyer's duty to provide competent representation
is not unique. Rule 1.1 and the factors presented in the comment to
determine whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill necessary
for collaborative representation still apply. However, not every lawyer is
suited for collaborative law, nor is every client. A lawyer must be extremely
vigilant to ensure the lawyer has not only the training and experience, but
the mindset to follow the collaborative process. Similarly, one component
of competence for a collaborative lawyer is the ability to determine if a
client is suitable for participation in collaborative law.
[6] In its infancy, much confusion generated around the compatibility
of collaborative law with the Rules due to mischaracterizations that the
collaborative lawyer represented both parties, the family, or the process
itself A collaborative lawyer does not represent the other party in the
traditional sense. Nor is a collaborative lawyer engaging in multiple
representations. Nor is a collaborative lawyer acting as a lawyer for the
situation. A collaborative lawyer represents a single client. Each
collaborative lawyer has been instructed by the respective client to facilitate
resolution of a common dispute using collaborative law techniques.
Therefore, collaborative lawyers engaged in fulfilling their separate
representational roles for their individual clients stand in the same
relationship to the dispute-both have been charged to facilitate resolving
it. This does not, however, transform the character of the representation of a
single client into a joint representation.
[7] A collaborative lawyer's role is to provide an organized framework
that will make it easier for the parties to reach an agreement. A
collaborative lawyer should help the parties communicate, identify issues,
ask questions, and suggest solutions. Collaborative lawyers and the parties
must work together to keep the process honest, respectful, and productive.
[8] Collaborative law is based on the use of informal discussions and
conferences, often called four-way conferences, where the parties and
collaborative lawyers engage in good faith participation. Collaborative
lawyers often use interest-based bargaining and creative problem solving
119
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strategies. Collaborative lawyers should help the parties take a reasoned
approach on all issues.
[9] Collaborative lawyers should encourage the use of joint experts and
consultants. All joint experts and consultants retained through the
collaborative law process will be directed to work in the same collaborative
manner to resolve issues without resorting to judicial intervention.
[10] The collaborative process requires voluntary production of all
information that a reasonable decision maker would need to decide an issue.
If a client discloses to a collaborative lawyer relevant information with the
instruction that the lawyer not disclose it, the collaborative lawyer is
ethically bound by paragraph (e) to advise the client that refusal to disclose
relevant information is contrary to the principles of collaborative law. The
collaborative lawyer must refuse to proceed unless the information is
disclosed. If, after advice and counsel, the client continues to refuse
voluntary disclosure, the collaborative lawyer must withdraw from
representation and terminate the collaborative process in accordance with
paragraph (g).
[11] The collaborative lawyer should not take advantage of
inconsistencies, inadvertent misstatements of fact or law, or
miscalculations, but should disclose them and seek to have them be
corrected. If a collaborative lawyer discovers inconsistencies, inadvertent
misstatements of fact or law, or miscalculations, made by the client, any
consulting professional, or the other collaborative lawyer, the lawyer should
inform the person of the discovery and request the person to make the
required disclosure. The collaborative lawyer must disclose the lawyer's
own inconsistencies, misstatements, and miscalculations.
[12] Confidentiality of the collaborative process is essential. A
collaborative lawyer shall not disclose information arising from and relating
to the collaborative representation whatever the source unless required or
permitted to do so under Rules of Professional Conduct or other applicable
law. The collaborative lawyer should ensure that the client and consulting
professional also adhere to strict confidentiality provisions.
[13] Paragraph (g) specifies the collaborative lawyer's duty to
withdraw. A central feature of collaborative law is that neither collaborative
lawyer may represent the parties in litigation. If either party undertakes
contested judicial action, the collaborative lawyers must withdraw. Two
other situations also require termination of representation. If the parties are
unable to settle the issues in dispute through the collaborative process, the
collaborative lawyers should withdraw. However, nothing in this section
precludes the collaborative lawyers from continuing to represent the clients
using other alternative dispute resolution processes for all or part of the
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issues in dispute provided the parties and collaborative lawyers mutually
agree. A collaborative lawyer must also withdraw if either party abuses or
undermines the collaborative process, such as knowingly withholding or
misrepresenting information having a material bearing on the case. If a
collaborative lawyer withdraws or is terminated for any other reason, the
party may retain a new collaborative lawyer and continue the process.
[14] The collaborative lawyer shall explain to the parties that in the
event of termination of representation, the lawyer will assist the client in
obtaining new counsel; however, each party will incur additional attorneys'
fees to hire new counsel.
[15] A withdrawing collaborative lawyer must comply with applicable
law requiring notice to a tribunal when terminating representation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proposed Model Rule 2.2 is an attempt to advance the conversation
concerning the ethics of collaborative law from its current position. Instead
of speculating on the application of Rules that were not drafted with a
collaborative model in mind, Proposed Model Rule 2.2 allows energy to be
invested in what the ethics of collaborative law practice should be. By
creating a stand alone Model Rule, there can be no question that the practice
of collaborative law can be consistent with professional ethics. The major
ethical questions of compatibility with being a zealous advocate, the
appropriate duty of candor, the scope of representation and termination, and
confidentiality are all addressed. Proposed Model Rule 2.2 is a start.
There are certainly open questions concerning the ethics of collaborative
practice that are not included in Proposed Model Rule 2.2 that warrant
continued discussion. For example, questions concerning attorneys' fees may
need to be addressed. There are some collaborative law groups that view
attorney fee parity as important to the collaborative process and include fee
parity in their codes of conduct. 296 Given the absence of the provision from
other guidelines, there does not appear to be consensus on fee parity as an
essential ethical requirement. Professor Macfarlane's research also indicates
that increased transparency may be necessary concerning collaborative law
fee structure. In particular she notes that the practice of billing for all
296 See TESLER, supra note 5, at 144 ("We agree that our lawyers are entitled to be
paid for their services, and the first task in a collaborative law matter is to ensure parity of
payment to each of them."); San Francisco Collaborative Law Group, Statement of
Principles of Collaborative Law, supra note 159 ("The Collaborative process requires
parity of payment to each attorney.").
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discussions made between members of the collaborative team leads to
disputes that could be avoided by better informing the client in advance. 297
By far, the most significant issue omitted from Proposed Model Rule 2.2
is the question of privilege. The concept of a confidential relationship
between an attorney and client is supported by three interrelated doctrines:
attorney-client privilege, work product, and confidentiality established by
professional ethics. 298 The Model Rules control only one of these areas-
confidentiality by professional ethics.299 Consequently, Proposed Model
Rule 2.2 does not include provisions for clarifying the applicability of
privilege or work product doctrine. This is not to say that explicit extension
of an attorney-client privilege or work product should not be addressed. 300
Both North Carolina301 and Texas 30 2 present models for experimentation.
However, these two elements of the confidential relationship must be
governed by state law and evidentiary rules; they are not properly part of the
Model Rules.
As collaborative law continues to spread both across North America and
outside of family law disputes, other ethical issues will undoubtedly surface.
This does not, however, provide a reason to wait. Concerns about the
compatibility of collaborative law with the existing legal ethical regimes
should not stand as a roadblock. Collaborative law probably can be
shoehorned into an ill-fitting pair of existing ethical shoes. But why? The
reality is that the drafters of the Model Rules were not considering
collaborative law when they were penned, adopted, or amended. At the same
time, the thousands of lawyers currently engaged in collaborative law
practice are not engaged in unethical conduct merely by following
collaborative law procedures. Rather, collaborative law is squarely in the
mainstream of nonadversarial alternative dispute resolution techniques and
its practice is an ethically appropriate representational role for an attorney.
Adoption of Proposed Model Rule 2.2 answers any lingering doubts.
297 See Macfarlane, supra note 22, at 211 (describing fee transparency issue).
298 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2004).
299 Id.
300 See Spain, supra note 72, at 169 (suggesting need to explore privilege).
301 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2005) ("All communications and work product of any
attorney or third-party expert hired for purposes of participating in a collaborative law
procedure shall be privileged and inadmissible in any court proceeding, except by
agreement of the parties.").
302 See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text (discussing Texas collaborative
law privilege).
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